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ABSTRACT 
The Obama Administration designated the local community as the first line of defense 
against violent extremist radicalization in the United States.  In doing so, they called on 
communities to utilize existing structures such as community policing and to draw on 
successful models such as the Department of Justice’s Comprehensive Gang Model. 
Research to date, however, has not shown how this model should be adjusted at the local 
level to address the specific mechanics of radicalization within the United States. 
Insufficient attention has been paid to the specific mechanics of recruitment at the 
individual level within vulnerable communities at the front end of the radicalization 
cycle.  The purpose of this thesis is to identify strategy options for community policing 
within Muslim populations to counter radicalization before individuals turn to violent 
means. Prevention programs need to act in the same way and at the same level as the 
violent extremist activists within the target population to be successful. In a time of 
budget cuts and reduced resources these options can allow the community to be a force 
multiplier in the creation and effectiveness of counter radicalization programs. This paper 
attempts to provide a strategy and framework upon which to base future counter 
radicalization efforts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
As extremists try to inspire acts of violence within our borders, we are 
responding with the strength of our communities, with the respect for the 
rule of law, and with the conviction that Muslim Americans are part of our 
American family. 
-President Barack Obama, State of the Union, January 2011 
The terrorist operations of 9/11 caused the United States and other nations to 
begin looking inward towards their Muslim populations and asking the question, what do 
we know about our Muslim communities?  How do individuals in these communities 
move from being functioning citizens to individuals who are willing to join or participate 
in violent terrorist groups?  How are they radicalized and/or recruited?  Can we prevent 
home-grown radicalization and terrorism?  In an effort to gain the knowledge necessary 
to answer these questions, the United States and European nations such as Britain and 
France have turned to community policing as the ideal tool for interacting with Muslim 
communities.  In recent years this focus has become more intense within the United 
States, caused by the arrests of ‘homegrown terrorists’ such as the attempted Times 
Square bomber, drone bomber, and cells in Lackawanna, California, New Jersey, 
Portland, and North Virginia. Federal agencies and local police departments are now 
trying to get to the ‘left of the boom” by identifying potential radical threats and 
countering radicalization before terrorists become operational within the United States.  
Recently, the Obama Administration released guidance on this process in the form of two 
important documents: the National Strategy For Counterterrorism and Empowering 
Local Partners To Prevent Violent Extremism In The United States1.  These documents 
recognize the cases of radicalization within the United States inspired by violent 
extremist ideologies and name the local community as the primary actor in counter 
radicalization efforts.  The Administration recognizes that the Muslim communities, 
whose children are being targeted by activist and militant extremist ideology, are best 
                                                 
1 The White House “National Strategy For Counterterrorism,” Washington, 2011. and The White 
House “Empowering Local Partners To Prevent Violent Extremism In The United States,” Washington, 
2011.   
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positioned to lead counter radicalization efforts due to their personal connections and 
local knowledge of the community.  Research conducted by the PEW Research Center in 
2007, and again in 2011 reveals that Muslims living in the United States show no 
indications of increasing alienation or support for violent extremism.  In fact, Muslim 
Americans reject violence to a greater degree than Muslim populations’ centers.2  The 
American Muslim community also advocates a hands-on approach when dealing with 
extremists with 48% saying that Muslim leaders have not done enough to speak out 
against extremists.3  A majority (70%), holds unfavorable views of al-Qaida and even 
larger majority (81%) of Muslims in America feel that violence is never justified.4  
Muslim communities have also been active in helping law enforcement with the threat of 
homegrown terrorism.  The recent study by the New America Foundation and Syracuse 
University’s Maxwell School of Public Policy, found that “Muslims tipped off and/or 
cooperated with law enforcement in 22% of the cases of U.S. residents which were 
charged or convicted of some form of extremist activity.”5  Beyond individual Muslims 
the, “national Muslim organizations such as the American Islamic Congress (AIC), the 
Council of American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the Islamic Society of North America 
(ISNA), the Muslim American Society (MAS), the Muslim Public Affairs Council 
(MPAC), and the Islamic Supreme Council of America- have acknowledged that 
Muslims have a responsibility to counter al Qaida’s narrative.”6  This acknowledged 
responsibility by the Muslim community should be seen as an opportunity to incorporate 
their help into the fight against extremism in America. 
                                                 
2  Pew Research Center, Muslim Americans: No Signs of Growth in Alienation or Support for 
Extremism, Polling Data, (Pew Research Center: August, 2011), 1. 
3 Pew Research, Muslim Americans, 1. 
4 Pew Research, Muslim Americans, 4. 
5 New America Foundation and Syracuse University’s Maxwell School Study, “The Homegrown 
Threat,” New America Foundation, 2011, accessed October 25, 2011, 
http://homegrown.newamerica.net/overview 
6 Peter Neumannn, Preventing Violent Radicalization in America, Group Findings, (Washington: 
Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011),  34. 
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The community based approach promoted by the White House advocates a focus 
on our shared experiences with community-oriented policing (COP) at state and local 
levels.  COP is characterized by problem solving and partnerships between local stake 
holders, leaders, families, and law enforcement. In an era of restricted budgets and a 
struggling economy, this approach provides an ability to create counter radicalization 
programs from existing local structures and provides a local link for the federal 
government to partner with.7  In the document on empowering local partnerships the 
Administration promotes three examples of existing COP models which have been 
successful at engaging other forms of violence and extremism: the Comprehensive Gang 
model, Building Communities and Trust Initiative, and the Safe Schools/Healthy 
Students Initiative.8  These models provide the basis for communities as they look to 
implement counter radicalization programs within areas they have deemed at risk to 
violent extremists’ influences.  The primary goal of these programs as stated by the 
Administration is “to prevent violent extremist and their supporters from inspiring, 
radicalizing, financing, or recruiting individuals or groups in the United States to commit 
acts of violence.”9  However, the planning, preparation and implementation of such 
programs require not only an understanding of community-oriented policing in its various 
models, but also an understanding of the violent extremist ideology and how it is used to 
move an individual along the trajectory of radicalization to the point of accepting 
violence.  Without a basis for understanding how these two elements ( radicalization and 
the capabilities of community policing) interact;- future programs run the risk of being 
ineffective by either failing to properly engage the individuals being targeted or being 
seen by the Muslim community as invasive and violating their civil rights. 
This paper specifically looks at one model; the Comprehensive-Gang Model to 
provide the reader with an understanding of how counter radicalization programs can be 
                                                 
7 The White House “Empowering Local Partners To Prevent Violent Extremism In The United 
States,” Washington, 2011, 3. 
8 The White House “Empowering Local Partners To Prevent Violent Extremism In The United 
States,” Washington, 2011, 4. 
9 The White House “Empowering Local Partners To Prevent Violent Extremism In The United 
States,” Washington, 2011, 3. 
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structured within the community to counter extremism.  In addition, past and current 
efforts at community policing and counter radicalization efforts in Muslim communities 
are assessed to provide U.S. communities with a new and effective strategy on which to 
base future counter radicalization programs.  
A. THE PROBLEM 
The literature and case studies contained in this paper will show that the process 
of radicalization has been identified down to the mechanisms at the individual level and 
that the government has chosen a strategy capable of countering it- yet there remains a 
gap between knowledge and execution at the local level.  Many of the current policing 
models within Muslim communities correctly focus on integration and assimilation in 
order to address problems of alienation, isolation, economic mobility, and discrimination 
which can create the openings necessary for radicalization.  While these are important 
first steps in engaging the community and must be present before counter radicalization 
programs can be developed, they are not capable of counter-radicalization in their current 
form and must be modified.  To date, no specific models or techniques have actually been 
identified to enable the proper utilization of the capabilities of community policing within 
the context of counter radicalization.  As a result current practices are engaging the 
community but fail in countering radicalization or the possible subsequent recruitment 
into violent extremist organizations.  According to Wiktorowicz, “A focus on the process 
of persuasion allows one to examine patterns of joining that are specific to particular 
movement types.  In the case of radical Islamic groups, socialization is needed to 
indoctrinate individuals into the movement ideology so that they are willing to sacrifice 
themselves for a radical cause.  Prior processes, such as cognitive opening, religious 
seeking, and frame alignment, all affect the prospect of successful socialization and thus 
participation.”10  A potential model that will enable community policing techniques to 
focus on this process is presented below.  
                                                 
10 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajirun and Radical Islam” (paper presented to the 
conference, The Roots of Islamic Radicalism, Yale University, May 8–9, 2004), Accessed February 13, 
2011, www.yale.edu/polisci/info/conferences/Islamic%20Radicalism/ 
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While no universal profile of who is susceptible to violent extremist ideology 
exists, there are similarities in their pathways to violence that can be targeted by the 
community.  While some argue that social bonds are dominant over ideology and others 
argue that ideology is dominant over other factors, this paper will argue that they are in 
fact symbiotic.  The radical ideology is the driving force that supplies a sense of 
legitimacy to the actions of the group and in circular fashion it is the dynamics within the 
group that introduces or inflates the impact of the ideology.  This socialization through 
group dynamics is accomplished within social networks based on bonds of kinship, 
friendship and discipleship. 
During this socialization, informal recruiters, or those who sympathize with Al-
Qaida and its ideology and proselytize on its behalf, interact with young males within the 
three recruitment grounds described by Peter Neumann as places of congregation, 
vulnerability, and recruitment magnets. 11  Activists create bonds by playing the role of 
“father”, “friend”, and “spiritual guide”.  This method is similar to the concept of re-
parenting which is often used in community policing.  Interviewed extremists often refer 
to summer camps, white water rafting trips and paintball, activities designed to strengthen 
interpersonal bonds and group identity.12  This again is very similar to community 
policing techniques which compete at the individual level for the needs of young men in 
efforts to divert them from gangs or criminal activity.  Activists operate at the same level 
within the community as community oriented policing prevention techniques.  To 
effectively counter this socialization within networks by extremists, community policing 
techniques should focus on strengthening the bond between the individual and 
community while weakening the links between the individual and the networks 
delivering the extremist ideology.  Counter radicalization programs must compete 
directly with activists for the attention of the young male population to successfully 
disrupt the radicalization process and provide alternative pathways.  Through this model 
parents and the community can weaken the extremists bonds of friendship, kinship, and 
                                                 
11 Peter R. Neumann, Joining Al-Qaeda:Jihadist Recruitment in Europe, Vol. Adelphi Paper 399, 
(New York: Routledge, 2008), 28. 
12 Peter R. Neumann, Joining Al-Qaeda:Jihadist Recruitment in Europe, Vol. Adelphi Paper 399, 
(New York: Routledge, 2008), 39-41. 
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discipleship and counter the radicalized message which focuses on cognitive openings, 
frame alignment, and justification for violence.  This thesis proposes that this model can 
bridge the gap between academic knowledge and operational execution at the tactical 
individual level within Muslim communities and disrupt the socialization process of 
radicalization. 
B. SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify and explain strategy options for 
community policing within Muslim populations to prevent radicalization.  In a time of 
budget cuts and reduced resources these options can allow the community to be a force 
multiplier in the creation and effectiveness of counter radicalization and prevention 
programs.  Specifically, this thesis will describe how community policing programs 
should be tailored in terms of strategy, organization, and level of interaction to prevent 
the radicalization of Muslims by violent extremists within the United States.  
The primary scope of this research is to examine radicalization pathways and 
define the characteristics of effective counter radicalization programs.  Basically stated, 
the community needs to act in the same way and at the same level as the violent extremist 
activists within the target population.13  Radicals and activists have changed from a direct 
strategy (active recruiting, taking over mosques and public places, top-down direction) to 
an indirect strategy (social networks14, bottom-up self selection, cells guided by 
inspiration).  In response, community policing approaches need to shift in order to be 
effective in countering radicalization.  As the case studies will show, actions within 
prevention styled programs are most effective when they are indirect, decentralized, and 
operating at the individual’s level within the community. 
                                                 
13 Brian Michael Jenkins, Building an Army of Believers: Jihadist Radicalization and Recruitment, 
Testimonial, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007), 2. 
14 The tenents of friendship, kinship and discipleship which are proposed by Marc Sageman as the 
primary building blocks of cliques which can facilitate the radicalization process through group dynamics. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are major bodies of work and theories, which answer the two research 
questions: how are youth being radicalized and what should be done within the context of 
COP, to prevent and counter the radicalization of our youth?  A robust amount of 
research exists on the radicalization process.  These radicalization theories address the 
social, political or familial issues which may cause individuals to begin to radicalize.  
There is also an abundance of research stating that COP is the ideal platform to conduct 
counter radicalization programs.  However, what was not found were theories on how 
these responses should be organized or implemented within the framework of COP.  
Currently, the U.S. finds itself with a domestic threat that demands flexible and 
sustainable strategies that go beyond short term suppression or reactionary prosecution.  
Answering the question of how to shape prevention programs to counter radicalization 
will give state and local leaders another tool to achieve security and maximize public 
safety.  
As the U.S. moves forward with counter radicalization programs, state and local 
policy makers require new, non-resource intensive, non-invasive and sustainable means 
to achieve security objectives.  These programs not only deal with a domestic threat but 
an international community conscious of their immigrant and minority status and of 
ethnic ties to geographical origins outside the U.S.  Community policing prevention 
programs tailored with an understanding of radicalization, the role of the Muslim 
community, and the primacy of civil liberties can balance these issues while disrupting 
domestic radicalization and serving homeland security interests. 
1. Conceptual Literature 
The process of radicalization has been well documented and is best described in 
terms of activity within the community by social networking theory.  This theory is 
centered on works addressing al-Qaida and its affiliates which have concluded social 
bonds facilitate delivery and acceptance of the radical ideology.  These are informal 
networks are based on family, friends, or religious circles "religious mentor" type 
relationships.  Group dynamics facilitate the ideological radicalization which precedes 
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the joining of a formal group or network or committing a violent act.  These and similar 
theories are also sometimes referred to as the “Bunch of Guys” or “Halal” theory and are 
based on the one common variable among individuals who have conducted or attempted 
to conduct operations in the name of extremist militant organizations; they have made a 
link with violent extremism.15  A majority of the time this link was made through social 
networks in which the individual was already a member.  This suggests that a formation 
of networked friendships and socialization within these networks is a crucial element 
before recruitment into an extremist militant organization. Several works in this field 
contribute significantly to this understanding of radicalization trajectories and are worth 
reviewing.  Marc Sageman’s work16 in many ways pioneered the idea that social 
networking plays a significant role in the socialization process which proceeds 
radicalization and subsequent recruitment.  This theory was then built upon and expanded 
in 2006 by Edwin Bakker and then again in 2008 by Peter R. Neumann17. Thomas 
Precht’s works in Europe for the Danish Ministry of Justice and Michael Jenkins’works 
on U.S. domestic terrorism also describe a very similar radicalization process within their 
studies. 18  The findings in the NYPD report by Silber and Bhatt are similar but focus 
more on the role of religious ideology during this process as does the study by Garnstien-
Ross and Grossman19. 
The other schools of thought on radicalization, the structural-psychological 
approach and the political process model, attempt to explain radicalization through the 
                                                 
15 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2004), 135. 
16 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (2004) and Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in 
the Twenty-First Century  (2008). 
17 Peter R. Neumann, Joining Al-Qaeda:Jihadist Recruitment in Europe, Vol. Adelphi Paper 399, 
(New York: Routledge, 2008)., Edwin Bakker,  Jihadi Terorrists in Europe: Their Characteristics and the 
Circumstances in Which They Joined Jihad  (The Hague: Netherlandds Institute of International Relations 
Clingendal, 2006). 
18 Brian Michael Jenkins, Building an Army of Believers: Jihadist Radicalization and Recruitment 
Testimonial, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007)., Thomas Precht. Home Grown Terrorism and 
Islamist Radicalisation in Europe  (Danish Ministry of Justice, 2007). 
19 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An 
Emperical Examination of the Radicalization Process, Monograph, (Washington, D.C.: FDD Press, 2009)., 
Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt. Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat Monograph, (New 
York: New York City Police Department, 2007). 
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effect of ‘root causes’ on individuals which then move them to collective action.  The 
types of root causes discussed in structural-psychological models are socioeconomic, 
cultural, identity-based and political.20  The basic argument of this approach is that 
factors such as poverty, over-population, discrimination, unemployment, and poor 
economic mobility lead to feelings of isolation and alienation which in turn lead to 
radicalization.  These arguments follow the relative deprivation arguments made by Ted 
Gurr in his book Why Men Rebel.  These conditions result in a ‘bulge’ of young angry 
men who become an available pool that al Qaeda and similar organizations then recruit 
from.  The political process or social movement approach attempts to explain 
radicalization by examining the political environment in which the individual lives, the 
resources available, and the ideological framework they adhere to.21  However, these 
approaches are too vague to be properly measured and they downplay the role of 
ideology by assuming that Islamists only turn to terrorism and violence when political 
options are exhausted.22  While these social and political factors may indeed be necessary 
in the radicalization process none of them are sufficient to explain radicalization.23  If 
they were sufficient the millions of other young men in similar conditions would also be 
turning to terrorism yet only a small minority radicalize and only a smaller portion of this 
minority then continue all the way to violence.  Root cause and grievance approaches are 
broad, difficult to quantify and not useful when trying to draw from them the specific 
strategies needed for countering recruitment at the individual level within the Muslim 
community. 
The authors discussed above offer several options which can be useful to 
communities and police departments who have Muslim communities with at risk youth. 
Sageman argues that among other options we should focus on providing young Muslims 
                                                 
20 Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements (New 
York: Routledge, 2009), 19. 
21 Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements (New 
York: Routledge, 2009), 25. 
22 Ashour, De-Radicalization, 25. 
23 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2004), 95.  
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with alternative role models within the Muslim community for the young to emulate.24  
Garnstein-Ross and Grossman argue for Muslim civic engagement projects at several 
levels (i.e. children in Cub Scouts or parents involvement in school boards) initiated and 
led primarily by the Muslim community.  The NYPD report proposes that the need to 
identify those entering the process at the earliest possible stage makes intelligence the 
critical tool in helping thwart an attack or prevent planning of future plots.  Thomas 
Precht’s four counter radicalization measures parallel and complement these approaches: 
societal measures such as integration policies, counter ideology efforts to confront the 
radical Islamic narrative, awareness training for social workers, policemen, teachers and 
Imams, and increased public diplomacy to dispel myths about Western foreign policy.  
However, none of these suggestions lay out a strategy for incorporating these efforts into 
the existing structures of community policing and integrating programs to fully disrupt 
the radicalization process. 
This understanding of recruitment and radicalization is critically important as the 
United States faces a changing threat with increasing domestic implications.  Extremist 
activists are increasingly decentralized, networked and operating at the individual level 
within Muslim communities.  Countermeasures must be able to counter radical 
narratives, disrupt and impede radicalization, and ultimately divert individuals from 
trajectories which can end in terrorism.  Successful attacks within the United States have 
the potential of draining our resources, affecting our economy, and threatening our way 
of life. In order to formulate strategies to counter these attacks, federal and local 
governments must truly understand the capabilities and responsibilities of law 
enforcement, communities, and their respective roles in prevention.  
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will use a mixed methods approach to explain how to successfully 
conduct counter radicalization and prevention programs within community policing. The 
                                                 
24 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: 
University Of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 159. 
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process-tracing methodology will enable the causal chains to be identified in each case 
study to illustrate how the interplay of strategy, organization and level of interaction lead 
to prevention.  This inductive approach will allow the study to break historical cases into 
causal chains, highlighting effective practices within each individual case study and 
applying them towards an effective model for counter radicalization.  There are several 
strengths to this research design.  First, it does not require a good deal of empirical data, 
which is good since counter radicalization is a relatively new area of study for which 
there are limited cases.  Second, while data is scarce for counter radicalization there are 
well documented cases of individual radicalization trajectories, Community policing 
efforts in Muslim communities, and anti-gang efforts within community policing which 
will facilitate inducing a counter radicalization model. 
E. OUTLINE 
1. Chapter I: Introduction 
The Obama Administration has named the local community has the first line of 
defense against violent extremist radicalization in the United States.  In doing so, they 
call on communities to draw on existing structures such as community policing and to 
utilize successful models such as the Department of Justice’s Comprehensive Gang 
Model.  Research to date, however, does not address how this model should be adjusted 
to address the specific mechanics of radicalization to be effective.  This paper will 
attempt to fill the void between knowledge and operational execution by offering a 
strategy and framework upon which to base future counter radicalization efforts. 
2. Chapter II: Radicalization 
How radicalization is defined and discussed is extremely important to 
understanding and defining the problem and for the subsequent formation of a counter 
radicalization program.  This chapter will familiarize the reader with terms and 
definitions common to the process of radicalization and then will break down the actual 
process of how an individual is moved along the radicalization trajectory towards 
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accepting violence as a way of achieving a political agenda under the influence of a 
radical ideology. 
3. Chapter III: Shadow Parenting: Radicalization Mechanisms 
Shadow parenting differs from previous research as it looks at the relationship 
between ideology and networks as a symbiotic process where neither is routinely 
dominant.  This process differs in each individual but is a common, visible process which 
isolates the individual from the community and inserts the extremist as a substitute 
authority figure which provides guidance to the individual.  This visible process works in 
a decentralized, informal way to radicalize the individual through internalization of the 
extremist ideology and gradual acceptance of the justification for violence.  The concept 
of shadow parenting provides the community a lens through which to look at, and 
understand, the mechanisms of radicalization.  This lens can then allow targeted 
disruption of radicalization pathways to divert individuals from a trajectory of violence 
and counter the effects of violent ideology. 
4. Chapter IV: Community Policing 
Community policing has undergone many changes since its inception and as it is 
applied locally in response to different problems within different cultural and 
geographical influences.  This chapter will discuss its evolution and will assess the 
implementation of the comprehensive gang model along with current community policing 
efforts in Muslim communities. 
5. Chapter V: Community Policing and Counter Radicalization Efforts 
To date there has been only one formal counter radicalization effort aimed at 
preventing radicalization and subsequent recruitment into violent extremist organizations.  
This program is the United Kingdom’s PREVENT program which operates under the 
umbrella of a larger counter terrorism effort called CONTEST II.  This chapter will 
provide an overview and assessment of this ongoing program in order to provide the 
reader with an understanding of best practices in integrating community policing and 
counter radicalization efforts. 
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6. Chapter VI: Proposed Model 
This chapter will integrate material covered in the previous chapters into 
modifications which utilize the theory of strategic interaction to frame the correct 
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II. RADICALIZATION 
A. DEFINITION OF RADICALIZATION, IDEOLOGY AND ASSOCIATED 
TERMS 
How radicalization is defined and discussed is critical, not only to properly 
understand and state the problem of violent extremism, but also in the proper formation 
and structuring of prevention programs.  This chapter will provide the working 
definitions and framework for an educated discussion of radicalization, violent ideology 
and terms commonly associated with the process of radicalization.  A study of two 
individual case studies highlighting the different paths of radicalization will conclude the 
chapter and provide an introduction to the mechanics of socialization within 
radicalization pathways. 
Radicalization in America provides little in the way of actual recruits, as stated in 
a 2009 testimony to the Senate Homeland Security and governmental Affairs Committee 
when referring to the 100 individuals arrested post 9/11 for terrorist activities, “With 
roughly 3 million Muslims in America…100 terrorists represent a mere 0.00003% of the 
Muslim population- fewer than one out of 30,000.”25  This number now stands at roughly 
188 cases in 2011, with a perceptible increase in recent years as almost half of the cases 
occurred between 2009 and 2011.  This idea of scope and context must be applied to 
communities as leaders and government officials begin to craft counter-radicalization and 
prevention programs. 
Radicalization is a relatively small problem, “only four of the homegrown plots 
since 9/11 progressed to an actual attack in the United States, attacks that resulted in 17 
deaths…. by way of comparison, according to the FBI, between 2001 and 2009, 73 
people were killed in hate crimes in the United States.”26  Extremism connected with al-
                                                 
25 Brian Michael Jenkins, Going Jihad: The Fort Hood Slayings and Home-Grown Terrorism, 
Testimonial, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), 4. 
26 New America Foundation and Syracuse University’s Maxwell School Study, “The Homegrown 
Threat,” New America Foundation, 2011, accessed October 25, 2011, 
http://homegrown.newamerica.net/overview.1. 
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Qaida and its affiliates is confined within a specific ideology and should be similarly 
treated as a social problem when speaking in terms of prevention.  
The Islamic terms being used by violent extremist to justify their ideology also 
have multiple meanings and connotations for the Muslim community; misuse of these 
terms can create misunderstandings that block open dialogue between community leaders 
and local and state authorities.  As John Brennan, the Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security and Terrorism noted, “Violent extremism is neither unique nor 
inherent to any one faith.  Violence is something that every faith rejects but every faith 
has had to confront.”27  General themes and terms common to radical ideology and 
violent extremists’ propaganda will be briefly discussed and defined below to provide a 
common understanding of extremist ideology and why it resonates among some 
individuals.  Other links and resources will be cited for the reader if they wish to research 
this area further.  The focus of this paper however, will remain on the mechanics of 
radicalization and not on the specifics of extremist ideology.   
Radicalization: Marc Sageman, the author of Understanding Terror Networks 
defines radicalization as “The process of transformation from ordinary individual into a 
terrorist willing to kill and sacrifice life. Radicalization has four prongs: A sense of moral 
outrage for events locally and globally, this outrage is then interpreted in a specific way 
namely as a war against Islam.  This ideology appeals to certain people because it 
resonates with their personal experience of discrimination and makes them feel they are 
part of the larger war.  A few of these individuals are then mobilized through networks, 
both face-to-face and online to become a terrorist.”28 However, he maintains that social 
bonds are a critical piece throughout this process and the intensity of these bonds directly 
relates to the speed of the radicalization process and subsequent recruitment.  This is a 
very useful definition as it describes crucial elements along the entire trajectory of 
                                                 
27 John Brennan, in a speech at New York University, New York, February 13, 2010. Text found in: 
Peter Neumann, Preventing Violent Radicalization in America, Group Findings, (Washington: Bipartisan 
Policy Center, 2011), 31. 
28  Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks ( Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2004), 135. 
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radicalization that can lead an individual to violence.  Violent extremists can then 
manipulate this process to attract alienated and seeking individuals to their cause.   
Counter-Radicalization or Prevention: It should be clearly understood that in 
this paper the terms counter-radicalization and prevention refer to efforts that seek to 
influence the same population that extremists are trying to influence the young and 
alienated individuals seeking answers.  It is not a de-radicalization program which seeks 
to change the minds of extremists but rather a focused effort to reduce the potential pool 
of recruits they affect.  The goal of counter-radicalization is not to criminalize people or 
to seek prosecution, it is to influence people and offer alternatives to the extremists’ 
message and vision of the world. 
Recruitment: A clear distinction must be made between radicalization and 
recruitment when dealing with and creating prevention programs in order to focus efforts 
at the right end of the radicalization-recruitment-violence spectrum.  Radicalization is the 
internalization of a set of beliefs as described earlier in which jihad and violence is seen 
as the ultimate test of one’s convictions.29  Recruitment, on the other hand, is the end of 
the spectrum where an individual physically goes operational, by joining an extremist 
organization or forming a cell, with the intent to seek out the materials and means to 
conduct an actual attack. 
Violent Extremists: For the purpose of this paper, violent extremist are defined 
as “individuals who support or commit ideologically-motivated violence to further 
political goals.”30  The ideology and political goals referred to in this case are al-Qaida 
and its affiliates and adherents.  The term violent extremist will be used in the place of 
Jihadist, terrorist or Islamic militant.  Al-Qaida and associates refer to themselves as 
Jihadists but this term misuses the true meaning and intention of the word Jihad as it is 
understood by the vast majority of the Muslim community. 
                                                 
29 Brian Michael Jenkins, Building an Army of Believers: Jihadist Radicalization and Recruitment, 
Testimonial, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007), 2. 
30  The White House “Empowering Local Partners To Prevent Violent Extremism In The United 
States” Washington, 2011, 1. 
 18
Radical Ideology: The ideology espoused by extremists is based on the belief 
that Muslims and Islam itself have become corrupt by failing to follow the path of the 
righteous.  This corruption has caused the countries of the Middle East, despite their 
economic advantage of oil reserves, to fall politically and economically behind the rest of 
the world, even Israel, and lose the prominence and status once held in the Golden Ages. 
In order to regain to their rightful place the Muslim community must return to the 
“authentic faith and practices of the ancient ones, namely the Prophet Mohammed and his 
companions.”31  In order to better achieve this, extremist’s advocate a strict adherence to 
the Quran and the hadith (words, acts, deeds, that are attributed to the Prophet 
Mohammed).  These two documents are seen as the only legitimate messages from God 
through which legitimate beliefs and practices can be found.  As noted before, instituting 
this involves a redefining of jihad and al-shari’a as the appropriate mechanisms to form 
the ideal society free of western influences.32  As a religious basis for their ideology, 
extremists have tried to elevate the importance of jihad and place it as the missing sixth 
pillar of the five pillars of Islam (profession of faith, prayer, fasting, alms-giving, and 
pilgrimage).  This allows them to claim that jihad is an individual duty for every Muslim; 
a duty which cannot be ignored since Muslim lands are controlled by apostate regimes, 
the “near” enemy, or occupied by the West, the “far” enemy.  This ideology blurs the 
distinctions between the traditional notions of “offensive” and “defensive” jihad and 
instead makes it a “permanent revolution against internal and external enemies who 
usurped Gods sovereignty”.33  Only when the “far” enemy has been conquered can the 
extremist focus on the “near” enemy, which has been propped up and supported by the 
West, and institute a truly Islamic state which will be pleasing in the eyes of God.  To 
start this revolution, a “vanguard” (selected few) is needed to start the battle and lead the 
ummah (global Muslim community) along the righteous path.  The attraction and strength 
of this ideology to alienated and seeking individuals is its radical and simplistic 
                                                 
31 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks ( Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2004), 4. 
32  Ahmad Moussalli, “Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who is the Enemy?” Conflicts Forum: 
Beirut- London- Washington. Conflicts Forum, January 2009. 21. 
33  Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, 2nd Edition, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 4. 
 19
interpretations of the complex Islamic doctrines.  This ideology directly challenges the 
established schools of jurisprudence and permits direct study of the sacred texts for 
guidance by the individual Muslim.34 
B. THE NATURE OF RADICALIZATION 
When looking at the potential radicalization pathways or trajectories of 
individuals towards violence, it is necessary to consider the networks which they are a 
part of and how these networks affect them.  These networks consist of connections 
between the individual and their family, friends, and or religious peers and leaders.  
Violent extremists and those with similar views use these community networks to spread 
their message by using their understanding of these relationships to promote their 
ideology and prepare seeking individuals to join their groups.  In the past, extremists 
groups such as al-Qaida have sporadically used recruiters, but now rely on like minded 
extremists and activists who speak on behalf of jihad through speeches, social media, 
online forums, and publications.  This style of radicalization is decentralized, localized, 
and informal.35  Radicals and activists have changed from a direct strategy (active 
recruiting, taking over mosques and public places, top-down direction) to an indirect 
strategy (social networks, bottom-up self selection, cells guided by inspiration).  This 
method is unique as it recruits one person at a time and can be tailored to take advantage 
of that person’s current situation.  As Michael Jenkins, a senior RAND advisor notes, 
“the message from the global jihad is aimed directly at the individual.”  As stated before, 
this message argues that Muslims face challenges from western infidels and apostate 
regimes and is threatened by military attack, foreign occupation, social disintegration, 
and passivity of the Muslim Ummah.  The message delivered is that of duty; it is the duty 
of the individual young man to combat this attack on Islam.  This call of duty is mixed 
with romantic notions of adventure, a noble cause, feelings of belonging, and a sense of 
meaning.  It is a message that can resonate deeply with individuals who may be suffering 
                                                 
34 Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, 2nd Edition, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009),7. 
35 Brian Michael Jenkins, Building an Army of Believers: Jihadist Radicalization and Recruitment, 
Testimonial, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007), 2. 
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from feelings of anger, alienation, economic frustration and estrangement from their 
historical roots. 36 
This evolution in radicalization from a direct strategy to an indirect strategy has 
been well documented and is best described in terms of activity within the community by 
social networking theory.  This theory is centered on works addressing al-Qaida and 
global extremists which have concluded social bonds facilitate delivery and acceptance of 
the radical ideology.  While Sageman argues that these social bonds are dominant over 
ideology and Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman argue that ideology is dominant over other 
factors, this paper will argue that they are in fact symbiotic.  The radical ideology is the 
driving force that supplies a sense of legitimacy to the actions of the group and in circular 
fashion it is the dynamics within the group that introduces or inflates the impact of the 
ideology.  To reach this conclusion, the 188 post 9/11 confirmed cases of homegrown 
terrorism within the United States were studied to identify the presence of informal 
friendship, kinship, and discipleship networks.  These cases as compiled by the New 
America Foundation and Syracuse University’s Maxwell School study can be seen in 
Appendix A.37  This analysis found that informal networks were present in a clear 
majority (71%) of the cases.  These are informal networks are based on family, friends, or 
religious circles "religious mentor" type relationships.  While research shows that most 
often this occurs in face to face interaction, a small percentage of the time these informal 
networks interacted over the internet in virtual relationships.  Group dynamics facilitate 
the ideological radicalization which precedes the joining of a formal group or network or 
committing a violent act.  A majority of the time the link to extremist ideology was made 
through pre-existing social networks in which the individual was already a member or 
through a network that was formed in the seeking phase.  This suggests that a formation 
of networked friendships and socialization within these networks is a crucial element 
before recruitment into an extremist militant organization.  
                                                 
36 Brian Michael Jenkins, Building an Army of Believers: Jihadist Radicalization and Recruitment, 
Testimonial, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007, 3-4. 
37 New America Foundation and Syracuse University’s Maxwell School Study, “The Homegrown 
Threat,” New America Foundation, 2011, accessed October 25, 2011, 
http://homegrown.newamerica.net/overview 
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The social networking school of thought argues against the notion of ‘top-down’ 
recruiting from within this pool of available recruits and instead emphasizes the role of 
‘bottom-up’ recruiting or self selection.  These self selected individuals are increasingly 
radicalized and willing to conduct acts inspired by radical or violent ideology without 
formal links to militant groups or organizations  These individuals seek out answers 
either on the internet or face-to-face from like minded individuals who are most often 
friends or kinsman or find a group which fulfills this function.  They then learn and 
radicalize within these groups and networks as the radical ideology is amplified and 
internalized.  Two good examples which highlight the different ways individuals can be 
drawn down the path of radicalization are those of Samir Khan, a 25 year old from 
Charlotte NC., who became editor for the al-Qaida magazine Inspire and Adam Gadahn, 
“Azzam the American” who grew up in rural California and converted at the age of 17 
and later became a spokesman for al-Qaida. 
1. Individual Trajectories: Samir Khan and Adam Gadahn 
Samir Khan: Samir Khan was seven when he came to the United States in 1993 
with his parents and lived briefly in Queens before settling in Westbury, New York. He 
was born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to his parents, Zafar and Sarah Khan who were 
originally from Pakistan.  Samir lived on Long Island with his family, an older sister and 
younger brother, attending W.T. Clarke High School before graduating and moving with 
his family to Charlotte, N.C. when his father’s job took him in 2004.  
By most accounts, Samir’s childhood was that of a normal child in the suburban 
middle class. In high school he played football and had common interests such as video 
games and girls.  But it was during high school that classmates began to notice the 
increasingly extremist views held by Samir.  He refused to recite the morning pledge of 
allegiance and sophomore year began to wear a kufi, a brimless round cap, along with 
jalabiyas, the traditional long white robes, and became more isolated as he became more 
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obsessed with religion.38  His initial goals were laudable; according to his brother, “He 
said he just wanted to do good.  He wanted to go to heaven. He’s like, ‘Before I was so 
bad, so I think I’m just going to follow my religion in the most proper way’—and he 
didn’t want to commit sin anymore.”39  Yet his religious leanings were becoming more 
extreme and it was noticed by his parents.  During this time Zafar Khan enlisted the help 
and advice of a family friend Steve Elturk, the imam of the Islamic Organization of North 
America in Warren, Michigan.  Elturk found Samir to be separated from his classmates 
by feelings of alienation and isolation and as a result was turning to extremism for 
answers.  
Family friends and classmates say he became increasingly interested in extremist 
ideology after 9/11 and began to openly express hatred for the United States.  Some trace 
the turning point to 2002 when he attended a summer camp hosted by Tanzeem-e-Islami, 
a non-violent yet fundamental group.40  It was at the camp that Samir first came in 
contact with the Islamic Thinkers Society (ITS), a branch of the extremist organization 
Al-Muhajiroun based in the United Kingdom which expanded to New York in 2000.  ITS 
openly sympathizes with the extremist ideology and has had many connections to global 
extremists over the years.41  Samir turned to blogging on the internet to express his 
frustrations; beginning in 2001 he began a steady process of posting online comments on 
his blog, The Ignored Puzzle Pieces of Knowledge, which was hosted by the Islamic 
Networking Forum.  This Forum is a community well known among American 
extremists.  Several prominent American extremists such as Daniel Maldonado, Omar 
Hammami, Tarek Mehanna and Ahmed Abu Samra have been linked to the forum.42  
Some even believe Samir’s blog was the inspiration of Revolution Muslim, a radical 
                                                 
38 Mathew Chayes, “Samir Khan, al-Qaida figure, grew up on Long Island,” newsday.com, October 
06, 2011, accessed October 20, 2011, http://www.newsday.com/long-island/samir-khan-al-qaida-figure-
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39 Chaves, Samir Khan, 3. 
40 Peter Neumannn, Preventing Violent Radicalization in America, Group Findings, (Washington: 
Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011), 15. 
41 Aaron Y. Zelin, “ American Jihadi,” Foreign Policy, September 30, 2011, accessed October 21, 
2011, http://www.foriegnpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/30/samir_khan_dead_inspire_magazine. 
42 Zelin, “American Jihadi” 2. 
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splinter group of ITS, whose most notable member Zachary Chesser rose to fame after 
threatening the creators of South Park.  These postings turned more extreme in 2004, 
after viewing videos online of suicide bombers in Iraq, Samir openly expressed support 
onlinefor Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaida.43  This radicalization continued with Samir 
even changing his name in 2007 to “Insha Allah Shaheed,” meaning “God Willing to be a 
Martyr,” and culminated in a pro al-Qaida website called Jihad Recollections which he 
created after his move to Charlotte.  Friends in Charlotte say that by the time Samir 
arrived in North Carolina he was completely obsessed with extremist ideology.  A friend, 
Adam Azad related that during their first conversation Samir was critical of the local 
mosque for not highlighting the injustices in the world.44  Samir published four issues of 
Jihadi Recollections which proved to be a hit among American extremists with 
submissions from extremists like Portland’s Christmas tree bomber Mohamed Osman 
Mohamud.  These actions continued to worry his parents who attempted to restrict his 
access to the internet and facilitated interventions with Muslim community elders. 
The first formal intervention was initiated by Jibril Hough, a friend of Samir’s and 
spokesman for the Islamic Center of Charlotte, who invited Samir and his father to his 
house along with elders of the mosque.  It was an attempt to convince Samir that the 
extreme ideology he had become fascinated with was flawed and did not represent Islam.  
But the intervention along with two follow on meetings did not work and Samir remained 
committed to his cause.  Possibly feeling pressure from counter-terrorism officials after 
several of his online friends were arrested Khan left for Yemen in October 2009.  In 
Yemen, Samir is thought to have helped the launch of the al-Qaida magazine Inspire 
which debuted six months after his arrival, an English-language publication which uses a 
blend of ideology, interviews, do-it yourself guides and testimonials by other extremists.  
He is believed to have edited seven issues of Inspire and even wrote his own articles in 
                                                 
43 Mark Schone and Matthew Cole, “American Samir Khan Killed with Awlaki,” ABC News, 
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which he claimed “I am proud to be a traitor to America.”45  Inspire has been found in 
the possession of several extremist plotters and was used by Naser Abedo as a bomb 
building guide in his failed attempt on Fort Hood.  According to Aaron Zelin in an article 
for Foreign Policy, Samir Khan will go down in history as “One of the most important 
pioneers and influential figures in the history of the American jihadi movement,” due to 
his ability to make the extremist cause accessible to English speaking radicals and 
connect them not only to information but to each other. 
Adam Gadahn- Born in Oregon, Adam grew up in rural California and was not a 
second or third-generation Muslim, but a convert at the age of seventeen from a “normal” 
yet slightly eccentric family.  Adam grew up on a farm in the small settlement of 
Winchester with his parents Phil and Jennifer Gadahn.  It was an austere life by choice; 
Adam’s parents chose to separate themselves from a world they viewed as chaotic in 
hopes of finding a more peaceful life.  They raised goats and strove to be self sufficient 
while living in a cabin that they built with no running water or telephone and with 
electricity supplied by solar panels.46  Adam was homeschooled along with his younger 
sisters and brother but was active socially, playing in Little League baseball and attending 
Christian home school support groups.  Then, somewhere around 1993, Adam became 
interested in death metal and in its subculture found a community and world that he 
belonged in.  
Quickly becoming engrossed in the genre and its fan base, Adam began to trade 
music, research artists and correspond with others who felt the same way about death 
metal, according to Spinoza Prozak, a former death metal DJ, he was “probably in 
contact with, minimum, several hundred people worldwide.”47  Adam even experimented 
with making some recordings and mailed some of his tapes to his new friends.  Adam left 
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the farm at the age of sixteen in the summer of 1995 to live with his grandparents in 
Santa Ana with hopes of finding a job and maybe attending college.  
It was at his grandparent’s house that Adam found the internet and began research 
different religions in order to “fill that void.”48  It was during this online seeking that 
Adam found Islam and was attracted to its monotheistic message, and in the fall of 1995 
went to a mosque to lean more.  Adam read some of the literature given to him; continued 
research online and also read an English version of the Koran.  A few weeks later he 
returned to declare the shahada (confession of faith) and at Friday prayers announce his 
conversion to those assembled at the Islamic Society of Orange County. 
Adam was just as enthusiastic about his new religion as he had been with death 
metal; within a week he had written an essay about his conversion called  
“Becoming Muslim,” and in it wrote about his personal failings up to that point and his 
desire to live a better life in the future.  To accomplish this, Adam began to attend the 
mosque daily to pray five times and attend discussion groups.  One of the discussion 
groups was made up of a small group of men with a legalistic interpretation of Islam who 
met to discuss the Koran and talk about the ongoing wars in Bosnia and Chechnya.  They 
wore traditional turbans and robes and grew their beards and were critical of other 
Muslims who wore western style clothes or were perceived to behave in a secular way.49  
Adam quickly began to adopt the group’s legalistic outlook and dropped his western 
dress for traditional robes, grew a beard and even gave up his death metal collection.  As 
noted by Rafii Khatchadourian in his article for the New Yorker, “the discussion group 
was Gadahn’s first real social environment outside of his family, and it was composed of 
men like him, who yearned for authenticity in their faith.”  Hitham Bundakji, a mosque 
leader at the Islamic Society, noted that the group was comprised of well educated and 
articulate men who would be “very convincing to someone like Adam Gadahn.”  The 
commitment to the group’s legalistic and often extremist views grew as Adam moved 
into a small apartment with two members from the discussion group; an Egyptian 
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national named Hisham Diab and an American citizen named Khalil Deek who had been 
born in Palestine.  
Diab and Deek both had ties to international terrorism and would become Adam’s 
mentors as he learned about his new religion.  Diab’s ex-wife, Sarah Olson, described the 
relationship as that of a father-son, “They were his parents, they were very strict and 
mean. But they were his parents.”50  Adam followed his new mentor’s advice in all 
aspects of life, even to the way he addressed Olson and interacted with his parents. They 
would give him assignments such as memorizing the Koran and learning prayers in 
Arabic.51  Adam was instructed to separate himself from his family due to their Jewish 
descent (His father’s original name was Pearlman) and was even told that “if you’re a 
good believer, you’ll kill them.”52  This closed group became Adam’s sole resource as 
his legalistic view of religion was blended into the radical political views held by Diab 
and Deek. 
Adam’s existence was described by Zena Zeitoun, a convert who knew some of 
the men, as isolated and totally absorbed into the group.  The apartment they lived in was 
minimalistic with windows covered in sheets, newspaper on the floor to sit on, and 
Islamic writings decorating the walls. According to Zeitoun, “It looked like a dungeon”.53  
This isolation began to merge Adam’s goals and identity with that of the groups and 
Adam began to criticize other Muslims who fell short of his new standards.  This 
evidenced itself dramatically when he struck Bundakji, a mosque leader, who had 
witnessed his conversion and even given him a job at one point.  Bundakji was a target of 
the group due to his western dress and interfaith outreach in the community and was 
often referred to as “Danny the Jew”54 by Diab and Deek who had been barred from the 
mosque by him for their extremist views.  So when Bindakji reprimanded Adam for 
showing disrespect to the imam, Adam punched him.  Adam was ousted from the mosque 
                                                 
50 Peggy Lowe, “Radical Conversion, Part 3,” Orange County Register, September 26, 2006. 
51 Khathhadourian, “Azzam the American” 16. 
52 Peggy Lowe, “Radical Conversion, Part 3,” Orange County Register, September 26, 2006. 
53 Khathhadourian, “Azzam the American” 14. 
54 Khathhadourian, “Azzam the American” 14. 
 27
following the incident and several months later, in late 1997, he went to Pakistan.  Adam 
returned briefly the next spring and left a few months later after the funeral of his 
grandfather.  In 2004 Adam reappeared in front of the camera as Azzam al-Amriki, a 
wanted man and an extremist spokesman who has been introduced on video by Ayman 
al-Zawahiri, leading ideologue and new leader of al-Qaida. 
The cases of Samir Khan and Adam Gadahn represent two different but similar 
trajectories towards radicalization.  Both grew up in relatively normal environments yet 
sought out Islam to fill a void in their lives.  As they became more devout both were 
drawn into a sub-community which espoused radical ideology and a distorted view of 
Islam and its practice.  For Samir, it was his online community in the Islamic Networking 
Forum and visitors to his blog and website.  While Samir traveled to other mosques, it 
appears the hours spent in his parent’s basement in an online forum created the network 
where he talked with like-minded people and found justification for his views from 
radical ideologues.  This legalistic view came through in his conversations with friends 
and family and in the way he dressed.  Both of these served to further isolate him and 
cause him to withdraw into his online persona.  For Adam, Diab and Deek and their 
discussion group became his family and they became both his father and mentor as he left 
his old life behind and adopted his legalistic view of Islam.  Their mentorship along with 
the physical as well as emotional isolation allowed almost seamless delivery and 
acceptance of extremist ideology.  But how did this happen?  Why did it happen to these 
two and not their siblings?  What causes certain people to follow the radicalization 
trajectory to a violent end while most divert and how can this be manipulated?  The 
following chapter looks at the specific mechanisms which allow violent ideology to 
resonate within some individuals and how this can be manipulated by activists who 
support al-Qaida and its affiliates. 
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III. RADICALIZATION MECHANISMS 
How can communities counter radicalization if the motivations and experience for 
each person is unique? While we cannot consistently identify the type of individual most 
vulnerable to radicalization, or the type most likely to commit violent acts after being 
exposed to violent ideology, we do know vulnerable individuals travel on similar 
pathways as they radicalize.  The concept of extremists’ socialization within social 
networks provides the community a lens through which to look at, and understand, the 
mechanisms of radicalization.  This lens can allow targeted disruption of radicalization 
pathways to divert individuals from a trajectory of violence and counter the effects of 
violent ideology. 
To enable this understanding, looking at the social networking theory of Peter R. 
Neumann in his study on extremist’s recruitment in Europe is useful.55  Neumann’s study 
separated radicalization pathways into the actual individual and structural mechanisms 
which can facilitate the socialization process within the community.  Structural 
mechanisms are the physical places in which individuals attend activities or spend time; 
the individual mechanisms are the networks within these areas in which the individual 
interacted.  In order to test whether this framework for understanding radicalization 
applied within the United States it was analyzed by studying confirmed cases of 
radicalization in the United States to evaluate the frequency of appearance by these 
mechanisms.  As noted before, the data set used was the 188 confirmed cases of 
homegrown terrorism as compiled by the New America Foundation and Syracuse 
University’s Maxwell School study.56  (Appendix A) This analysis found that social 
networks were present in a clear majority (71%) of the cases.  These were then analyzed 
for the interplay of ideology within networks based on friendship, kinship, and 
discipleship.  These bonds are proposed by Sageman as the primary building blocks of 
                                                 
55 Peter R. Neumann, Joining Al-Qaeda:Jihadist Recruitment in Europe Vol. Adelphi Paper 399, 
(New York: Routledge, 2008).   
56 New America Foundation and Syracuse University’s Maxwell School Study, “The Homegrown 
Threat,” New America Foundation, 2011, accessed October 25, 2011, 
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cliques that can facilitate the radicalization process through group dynamics.  The 
networks studied were sometimes pre-existing and sometimes they were created during 
the seeking phase of the individual.  The approach taken by this thesis differs from 
previous research as it looks at the relationship between ideology and networks as a 
symbiotic process where neither is routinely dominant.  This process differs in each 
individual but is a common, visible process, which isolates the individual from the 
community and inserts the extremist as a substitute authority figure which provides 
guidance to the individual.  While research shows that most often this occurs in face to 
face interaction, a small percentage of the time these informal networks primarily 
interacted over the internet in virtual relationships as was the case with Colleen LaRose 
also known as “Jihad Jane.”  This visible process works in an informal way to radicalize 
the individual through internalization of the extremist ideology and through gradual 
acceptance of the justification for violence. 
Group dynamics within social networks facilitate the ideological radicalization 
which precedes the joining of a formal extremist group or network or committing a 
violent act.  Many times this process starts with best of intentions; they want to be a 
better person, they want to help fellow Muslims, they want to donate money and time, but 
above all they want to do something.  Studies have shown that group membership is 
driven by internal motivations, “The need to find, or restructure, a meaningful identity 
drives many towards extremist groups.  Becoming a member of a group and sharing 
meaningful group identity, enhances an individual’s self-esteem, especially when self-
esteem has been damaged.”57  Beside the search for religious answers initial goals may 
have also been nationalistic (such as free Somalia), or may have been humanitarian (bring 
aid or give assistance to refugee camps in Afghanistan) and these desires can start the 
seeking behavior where individuals look for other people who have similar concerns.  
This seeking and need for fulfillment guides the individual into the radicalization 
pathway where good intentions can be transferred and ideals altered.  See Figure 1. 
                                                 
57 Susie Driscoll, “The Psychological Motivation & Socialization of Suicide Bombers,” unpublished. 
Presented in lecture notes by Professor Dorothy Denning of the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2011. 
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Figure 1.   Radicalization Pathway (From: 58) 
Within this pathway, the individual seeks answers in recruitment grounds; here 
they interact with recruiters who utilize the environment to shape and deliver the 
message.  For the individual this process starts with a ‘trigger’ or dissatisfaction with 
some aspect of their life.  As noted before, relative deprivation (poverty, discrimination, 
alienation, poor economic mobility, perceived injustices) are necessary but not sufficient; 
these are the items which enable cognitive openings.  These openings can be real or 
perceived personal crises which shake an individual’s personal beliefs and understanding 
of his or her place in the world leaving them open to the possibility of alternate views.  
                                                 
58 This figure is based on work by Peter Neumann and Marc Sageman. The author has added  the 
tenets of friendship, kinship, and discipleship which are proposed by Sageman as the primary building 
blocks of cliques which can facilitate the radicalization process through group dynamics. Peter R. 
Neumann, Joining Al-Qaeda:Jihadist Recruitment in Europe  Vol. Adelphi Paper 399, (New York: 
Routledge, 2008), 28 & 41). 
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These crises can be political, cultural, economic or personal.59  Depending on the 
personal circumstances this leads the individual to seek answers in the areas of 
congregation, vulnerability or recruitment.  Areas of congregation are common places 
where individuals voluntarily attend to interact with others such as community centers.  
Places of vulnerability differ in that attendance is usually not voluntary.  The individual is 
driven to that area to fulfill a need or to fulfill a legal requirement.  Recruitment magnets 
draw individuals by their very nature.  These are areas that are publicly known to contain 
extremists propaganda. In these areas the individual interacts within his or hers pre-
existing networks which are based on family, friends, or religious circles "religious 
mentor" type relationships or is drawn into groups which attempt to recreate these bonds.    
Socialization within these networks helps to fill the void in the individuals’ life 
and seeks to fulfill their needs in competition with normal institutions such as the family 
or community.  Activist can either be or play the role of “father”, “friend”, and “priest” , 
building bonds that when strengthened separate the individual from his family and 
friends.  Interviewed radicals often refer to summer camps, white water rafting trips and 
paintball, all activities designed to strengthen interpersonal bonds and group identity.60  
During these activities, activists deliver the extremist message which is amplified through 
group dynamics.  This process can lead to isolation from moderate influences such as 
friends and families and facilitates an acceptance of radical views and extreme 
ideologies.  Isolation creates an environment where frame alignment ( the process of 
developing a us vs. them mindset) leads to the justification for violence and ultimately 
the link or catalyst to jihad.61  The act of both physically and psychologically isolating 
                                                 
59 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajirun and Radical Islam” (paper presented to the 
conference, The Roots of Islamic Radicalism, Yale University, May 8-9, 2004), Accessed February 13, 
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60 Neumann, Joining Al-Qaeda, 39–41.* The Virginia Jihad Network or so called “Paintball Cell” is a 
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Islamic scholar named Ali-Timimi. Following 9/11 Timimi, the group’s spiritual guide, pulled aside a 
select few of his followers and warned them that the attacks constituted the opening of a final conflict 
between Muslims and non-Muslims and that it was their duty to train for jihad and be ready to join the 
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Army veteran, served to strengthen the resolve of the members by reinforcing their friendship and 
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61 Neumann, Joining Al-Qaeda, 28. 
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the group from society and other community influences allows activists to successfully 
establish and legitimize group behavior and shape expectations through the use of 
orchestrated group behavior.  This enables the group to effectively merge the individual 
into the collective group.62   
In the following sections this process will be broken down and discussed step by 
step to illustrate the effects of shadow parenting throughout the radicalization process. 
Cognitive Openings and the Recruitment Grounds: In the case of Faisal 
Shahzad, the Times Square bomber, the opening was the events of 9/11 and the following 
invasion of Iraq in 2003.  The “triggering” event was when Pakistani forces raided the 
Red Mosque in Islamabad where he frequently worshipped during trips to visit Pakistan.  
This raid, along with ongoing drone strikes in the region where his family traced it roots, 
finally moved Shahzad to the far right of the radicalization spectrum where violence was 
the next step.63  For Samir, the opening and “trigger” were the events of 9/11 and 
viewing videos of suicide bombers and for Adam it was the need to fill the “void” in his 
life and the physical confrontation with the prayer leader.  This stage appears to be 
slightly different for new converts than born-in Muslims which re-engage with a long 
held belief system.  Converts appear to move faster down the radicalization pathway once 
radical ideology is introduced whereas those born Muslim appear to take a more gradual 
and incremental approach. 
It is during this period that new converts are weakest; the notion that 
understanding Islam does not require a central religious figure or religious training and 
can be understood and taught by anyone opens the door to radicalization.  As Adam 
Gadahn said in his essay Becoming Muslim, “I discovered that the beliefs and practices of 
this religion fit my personal theology and intellect as well as basic human logic. Islam 
presents God not as an anthropo-morphic being but as an entity beyond human 
comprehension…..Islam has a holy book that is comprehensible to the layman, there is no 
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papacy or priesthood that is considered infallible in matters of interpretation: all Muslims 
are free to reflect and interpret the book given sufficient education.”  This aspect of Islam 
leaves new members susceptible to believing the initial person or group that takes the 
time to explain their new religion. 64 
Cognitive openings can result in seeking out the advice or thoughts of friends or 
relatives or spiritual leaders who may have more radical views or interpretations of Islam.  
These interpretations can be perceived by the individual as answering gaps or 
inconsistencies currently being experienced in life.  This seeking takes place in the 
recruitment grounds—places of congregation, vulnerability or recruitment magnets.  
These are places where activists or people espousing radical ideology can be met and 
here the bonds of friendship, kinship, or discipleship are used to draw the individual 
seeker into groups with similar views.  Spreading radical ideology can be done through 
several mediums; social media (blogs and personal websites), publications (newsletters, 
pamphlets, or something as formal as the Inspire magazine), online videos, internet chat-
rooms, or face to face in prayer groups or smaller informal discussion groups away from 
the mosque. 
Recruiters and Frame Alignment through Shadow Parenting: The American 
cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, an example of discipleship (occurring in 4% of cases in the 
United States, as shown in Appendix A), was popular among American extremists 
because of his accessibility.  He maintained a Facebook page, a blog, and posted 
YouTube videos in English; he answered the emails of curious seekers and offered 
guidance.  Due to this wide array of media outlets, made accessible through the use of 
English, several American extremists responded to his messages.  A quick list of those 
inspired by Awlaki includes Betim Kaziu, Shaker Masri, Antonio Martinez, Zachary 
Chesser, Barry Bujol, Nidal Hasan and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.  
The “Fort Dix 6” and the “D.C. 5” are a mixture, containing elements of both 
friendship and kinship networks (kinship occurred in 12% of cases in the United States).  
The North Carolina terror cell arrested in 2009, and led by Daniel Boyd, is a classic case 
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of kinship networks at play.  Daniel Boyd, a halal butcher, recruited two of his sons along 
with four other men to conduct jihad.  The men met in a prayer group at the Boyd’s house 
and trained in military tactics to prepare themselves.  According to the Department of 
Justice, Boyd radicalized the group to believe that jihad was a personal obligation and 
even took one of his sons to Palestine “to introduce him to individuals who also believed 
violent jihad was a personal religious obligation.”65  The direct link from father to son in 
this case is a clear example of how kinship can be used draw in young and 
impressionable individuals through the authority wielded by family members and 
reinforced by ideology. 
The Virginia “Paintball Cell”, the “Portland 7”, “Liberty City 7”, and the 
“Lackawanna 6” are all examples of friendship networks, (the primary network found, 
occurring in 68% of the 188 cases, as shown in Appendix A) some of which were 
manipulated by a spiritual guide or sanctioner.  These results echo findings from the 
NYPD report and the Garnstein-Ross and Grossman report which found that 20% of 
cases in their sample had a spiritual mentor and 25.6% had a spiritual sanctioner who 
provided guidance.66  This differs from discipleship as it is not a formal cleric in a 
Mosque or Madrassa setting but someone without clerical credentials who provides 
religious guidance.  The NYPD report finds these archetypes necessary for the evolution 
from a ‘bunch of guys” to terrorist cell willing to plan and conduct operations.67  This is 
key as the report notes, “for those groups who do not seek jihad abroad, the dedication 
and commitment of their leader to jihad is often the main factor in determining whether 
the group will commit a terrorist act or not.”68  The recent report by the National Security 
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Preparedness Group also notes, “That extremist ideas are more likely to resonate if they 
are articulated by a credible or charismatic leader.”69  
For the “Lackawanna 6” it was Kamal Derwish who acted as the spiritual guide 
and mentor to young Muslims in the Lackawanna area.  Derwish was charismatic, 
engaging and fresh from Saudi Arabia; he was fluent in the Koran and seemed to be the 
perfect Muslim role model for the young restless men of Lackawanna.70  Derwish, who 
saw Lackawanna as “virgin territory”, began to hold prayer meetings at the house he 
shared with Yahya Goba, one of the “Lackawanna Six.”71  Derwish mixed his studies of 
the Koran with stories of fighting in Palestine and Bosnia and offered a sense adventure 
along with a distinct and simple interpretation of Islam to his avid listeners.  The study 
group naturally tightened over time to a group of high school friends who at first attended 
more on the desire to hang out with friends rather than focus on religion.72  Yet as time 
went on Derwish began to introduce a more legalistic view of Islam and introduced the 
group to the works of Sayyid Qutb.  This introduction to radical ideology was followed 
by increasing criticism of the lifestyles of those in the group.  These criticisms along with 
his interpretations of what was righteous created an “uncompromising religious 
atmosphere.”  This change in focus was the institution of “frame alignment” or the 
isolation of the group members from society to create the necessary (us vs. them) 
mentality that leads to the justification of violence as the only way to reconcile the 
perceived schism between the group and their environment.  To help those in the group 
along the right path Derwish recommended radical websites to help them find a way that 
they could make up for being “too American.”73  In addition to recommending extremist 
literature, Derwish brought into the group a spiritual sanctioner, someone with the 
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credentials to tell the young men that jihad was the only way to salvation.  The sanctioner 
was a young imam who had fought with Derwish in Bosnia and had similar extremist 
views.  The imam told the young men of Lackawanna that jihad was the only way to save 
their souls and that they must train; God needed men of action.  Within days Derwish and 
five of his followers had decided to travel to Afghanistan and train for jihad.74 
It is also important to note that the individual seeker can also be the catalyst for 
forming the group and pushing its radical agenda.  Tarik Mehanna is an example of such 
a seeker.  After 9/11 he constantly surfed the internet looking for videos, articles and 
material related to the attack.  He also became interested in the ideology of al-Qaida and 
the concept of jihad.  Ahamd Abousamra, a childhood friend, was receptive when Tarik 
shared propaganda with him and began to actively search with him for others to join their 
newfound cause.  During this process they met Daniel Maldonado, a recent convert who 
was of similar age.75  In Maldanado, the two found a like mind and the three became 
activists in their own rights publishing CD’s and posting on extremist blogs.  The three 
were soon spending their free time viewing jihadist video propaganda and discussing 
their newfound sense of duty.  Both Mehanna and Maldanado became active participants 
in online forums such as the Islamic Awakening forums, Islamic network, and Clear 
Guidance.76  It is here that Maldanado became friends with Omar Hammami, an 
American and member/leader in al-Shabaab, and decided to move to Somalia and join the 
fighting there to fulfill his dreams of jihad.  
As demonstrated by these examples, the real or created bonds of friendship, 
kinship, and discipleship form the mechanism which enables the individual’s identity to 
be fused into group identity through frame alignment and facilitates the acceptance of 
extreme ideology and the identification of the individual with a larger cause.  This 
process results with the individual taking on the characteristics of the group; in the same 
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way that Adam Gadahn began to emulate the legalistic example of his spiritual guides, 
Diab and Deek. 
The Visible Signs of Frame Alignment- Prior to becoming operational (or 
reaching the far right of the radicalization spectrum where violence becomes justified), 
groups and individuals often become more religious and extreme and will attempt to 
impose their beliefs on the community often focusing on family or close acquaintances.77  
This intensification of religious beliefs is described in Garstein-Ross and Grossman’s 
work on domestic radicalization in the U.S. and U.K. as being manifested in six distinct 
ways:78 
1. How rigidly or (legalistically) one may interpret one’s religion 
2. Who he come to trust and not trust 
3. How he/she views the relationship between the West and Islam 
4. Manifesting a low tolerance for religious deviance 
5. Attempting to impose one’s beliefs on others 
6. Expressing radical views 
The first three indicators are personal and will often shape the ‘seeking’ behavior 
of the individual as they looks for answers and other like minded people with which to 
discuss their ideas.  The last three indicators are good signs of the socialization and 
intensification process described by Neumann.  The stronger the group identity and more 
intense the radicalization, the more the group will try to change or act out against those 
around it who do not conform or follow what they believe to be right. It is important to 
note that while radicalization is necessary for the trajectory to terrorism it does not 
automatically commit the individual to violence.  
The process of radicalization is not linear; some individuals need multiple drivers 
(grievance, ideology, and mobilization) and years to reach a point where they accept 
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violence while others may be convinced by a single event.79  As noted by Brian Jenkins, 
“Radicalization is a pre-requisite to terrorism—there are no moderate bombers—but 
radicalization does not automatically and inexorably propel one all the way to 
violence.”80  Many individuals become disillusioned with the process and de-radicalize 
or stop short of violence because of: family intervention, inconsistencies in ideology, 
hypocrisy, and hardship caused by membership, or a change in environment such as 
moving away from the groups influence.81  These are aspects that counter radicalization 
and prevention efforts must seek to replicate.  Extremist actions and ideologies have 
inconsistencies that can be used against the extremist to disrupt the radicalization 
pathways of vulnerable individuals.  This understanding of radicalization reveals 
important insights into elements of the radicalization process and the central role of 
religious ideology and socialization within networks.  Radicalization is a “visible 
process” it occurs within networks known to the community and the community 
infrastructure.  Manifestations of radicalization are first felt by family and close friends 
making them the first actors in any prevention or counter radicalization programs.  This 
finding underscores the importance of Muslim civic engagement efforts and their role in 
future programs.  According to the Garnstein-Ross and Grossman, “Such engagement 
efforts seem most effective at countering radicalization when they come from the Muslim 
Community itself”.82   
A. CURRENT U.S. POLICY 
What is current U.S. policy and how does it address these trends?    
Acknowledging the apparent increase in the tempo of “homegrown terrorism” Homeland 
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Security Secretary, Janet Napolitano has expressed the view that, “the threat today may 
be at its most heightened state since the attacks nearly 10 years ago.”83  Some of the most 
serious plots and attacks since 9/11 have taken place between 2007–2010,highlighted by 
the New York subway plot, the Fort Hood shootings, the attempted Times Square 
bombing, and the most recent plot by Rezwan Ferdaus involving remote controlled 
planes destined for the Pentagon.  The Department of Justice and the White House have 
both advocated a community based approach by emphasizing the fact that prevention 
efforts should empower the communities that are targeted by extremist and remain 
distinctly separate from counter-terrorist efforts which target the extremist themselves.  
These communities need to be “protected, strengthened, and empowered in order to help 
them resist violent extremism.”84 
The recently released documents by the White House on this process have been 
described in a report by the National Security Preparedness Group as laying the 
framework for the creation of “a ‘Fourth pillar’ of its response to terrorism to tackle 
domestic radicalization and, in doing so, complement the other three pillars, that is, 
‘hard’ counterterrorism at home and abroad, as well as the strategy for countering violent 
extremism overseas.”85  The Administration recognizes that the Muslim communities, 
whose children are being targeted by activist and militant extremist ideology, are best 
positioned to lead counter radicalization efforts due to their personal connections and 
local knowledge of the community.  However, the planning, preparation, and 
implementation of such programs require not only an understanding of community-
oriented policing in its various models, but also an understanding of the violent extremist 
ideology and how it is used to move an individual along the trajectory of radicalization to 
the point of accepting violence.  This need has been recognized by the White House and 
it is reflected in their proposed areas of action: 1) enhancing federal engagement with and 
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support to local communities that may be targeted by violent extremists, 2) building 
government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism, and 3) 
countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals.86  This strategy 
reflects that the approach to counter radicalization should be multi-themed and not 
restricted to a single policy. To be effective, prevention programs should be implemented 
through multiple channels and embedded within programs already dealing with public 
safety or immigrant community education.87  These areas of action highlight a heavy 
emphasis on community involvement, community leadership, preemptive problem 
solving, and cooperation and trust- all tenants of community policing.  As noted in the 
beginning of this paper, community policing is an evolving concept which is executed 
uniquely within different jurisdictions.  The following chapter will discuss this evolution 
and look at case studies of successful models which can lay the basis for counter 
radicalization programs. 
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IV. COMMUNITY POLICING 
A. THE EVOLUTION OF COMMUNITY POLICING 
Community policing within Muslim communities has undergone major changes 
in the past 10 years in response to the growth of international and national ‘homegrown’ 
terrorism.  Pre- 9/11, police departments sought to reduce crime, fear of crime, and 
disorder through increased interaction within their communities. These interactions used 
problem solving and communication to address factors which contributed to crime.88  
Post- 9/11, community policing shifted to a focus specifically designed to reach out and 
understand Muslim communities within a counterterrorism context.  Under pressure to 
incorporate and meet federal counter-terrorism agendas, community policing responded 
in three ways: 1) Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP)  characterized by an emphasis on 
contacts, informants and gaining access to the Muslim community, 2) Homeland Security 
Policing (HSP) with a focus on counter terrorism, law enforcement, immigration  and 
prosecution of acts associated with terrorism, and 3) the original Community Oriented 
Policing (COP)  concept consisting of a partnership between the police and community 
leaders, with an increased responsibility put on the community and more emphasis put on 
protecting civil rights and liberties.89  Each policing approach has its merits and place in 
the spectrum of law enforcement duties necessary to ensure homeland security.  This 
spectrum involves interaction in the prevention, intervention, suppression and 
prosecution levels of law enforcement.  The approach that best fits prevention style 
programs is COP due to its cooperative interaction with the parents, teachers, leaders and 
agencies which interact daily with individuals prior to any formal entrance into the legal 
system. 
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1. Intelligence Led Policing 
The events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent government reports and 
commission findings have shown the vital role that intelligence plays not only at the 
strategic level but also at the local law enforcement level.  In response, efforts have been 
made to restructure intelligence infrastructures and enhance state and local law 
enforcement intelligence capabilities.  These changes make it possible for state and local 
law enforcement agencies to be integrated into homeland security. The U.S. department 
of Justice (USDOJ) defines this change as:  
Intelligence-led policing is a collaborative enterprise based on improved 
intelligence operations and community-oriented policing and problem 
solving, which the field has considered beneficial for many years. To 
implement intelligence-led policing, police organizations need to 
reevaluate their current policies and protocols. Intelligence must be 
incorporated into the planning process to reflect community problems and 
issues. Information sharing must become a policy, not an informal 
practice. Most important, intelligence must be contingent on quality 
analysis of data. The development of analytical techniques, training, and 
technical assistance needs to be supported. 90  
A drawback to this approach is that police departments must carry out normal 
duties while working to prevent terrorism and meeting the intelligence and agenda 
requirements of higher agencies.  The forms of collection commonly used in this 
approach are: physical surveillance, electronic surveillance, confidential informants, 
undercover operators, newspaper and internet reports and activity, and public records.  
An example of an agency operating according to this philosophy is the Los Angeles 
Police Department (LAPD) who is promoting a convergence method in which 
community policing and counterterrorism strategies are merged under the umbrella of 
intelligence-led policing.  This allows the LAPD to focus and integrate operations on a 
spectrum that ranges from petty crime to terrorists acts within their jurisdiction.91  
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However, this approach can cause suspicion and paranoia in targeted populations when it 
is used to ‘profile’ or ‘predict’ potential terrorists as evidenced by the LAPD’s failed 
effort to ‘map’ their Muslim communities in 2007.  The stated purpose of the program 
was to “help Muslim communities avoid the influence of violent, ideologically-based 
extremists by identifying at risk communities.”92  However, this was not how it was 
perceived and the subsequent protests and indignation by the Muslim community resulted 
in the cancellation of the program and severe damage to the relationship between the 
LAPD and Muslim community.  A current version of this story is playing out in New 
York where the NYPD has partnered with the CIA and is operating a Demographics Unit 
responsible for mapping Muslim neighborhoods.  The NYPD has sent “rakers” or 
ethnically appropriate officers into Muslim mosques and places of business to act as a 
“walking camera” and gather information about attendees.93  This revelation, from 
reporters of the Associated Press, has led to similar negative reactions from the New 
York Muslim population and has further strained relations which were weakened after the 
“Ground Zero” mosque debate. 
2. Homeland Security Policing 
With the increased threat of domestic terrorism, funding has shifted from 
traditional COP programs to homeland security focused programs in response to political 
pressure and public opinion.  These pressures have also caused a shift in training and 
execution; departments are developing new investigative functions, cooperating more 
openly with federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies, increasing the safety and 
security of critical infrastructure and overall increasing surveillance over local 
communities.94  
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Within this model, federal immigration and counterterrorism agendas backed by 
the PATRIOT ACT take priority over the police-immigrant relations valued by 
traditional COP.  This was readily apparent in early 2002, when the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) announced that it would send teams of federal, state, and local law 
enforcement agents to apprehend individuals who had remained in the country after being 
ordered deported.  However, this focus by the DOJ, placed solely on individuals who 
were from countries with al-Qaida links, strained the local law enforcements’ 
relationships with Muslim communities who saw the initiative as racial profiling.  
Another example of this was in Dearborn, Michigan, when in 2001 the DOJ announced a 
plan to interview 5,000 individuals who were temporary visa holders and from countries 
linked to al-Qaida. Local Dearborn police officers were asked to help conduct the 
interviews.  However, due to the community concerns aired during working groups with 
community leaders the local police helped facilitate the interviews but did not conduct 
any themselves.95  This action by the Dearborn Police averted a potential crisis and 
preserved the bonds of trust, which had been established through prior COP.  
3. Community Oriented Policing 
Community policing is an integrated, problem solving approach that focuses on 
building local relationships between the police and the community’s leadership and 
inhabitants.  Community policing techniques have been successful in cities such as: New 
York City, Chicago, Boston, San Jose, Dearborn and San Diego.  Due to these successes, 
COP techniques are being widely adopted in smaller municipal and county police 
departments across the United States.
96
  Many definitions and variations of COP exist but 
the following definition provided by the Homeland Security Institute will be used for this 
study, “a policing strategy and approach aimed at reducing crime and the fear of crime 
through proactive engagement with the community.  This assumes greater accountability 
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for the police, a greater role for the community in collaborative problem solving, and a 
greater concern for civil rights and liberties.”
97
  These strategies all involve four 
elements: prevention, intervention, suppression and prosecution.98  The weight given to 
each approach depends on the community and law enforcement actors involved.  
Prevention is focused on denying recruitment of youths into gangs or criminal activity by 
offering alternative avenues or activities.  Intervention strategies are designed with 
similar tactics but are meant to separate youth from illegal activities after they have 
already joined or committed criminal acts.  Suppression techniques involve methods 
which make it physically harder to commit crimes or raise the cost of participation. 
Prosecution techniques involve warrant sweeps, law amendments to address certain 
behavior, and/or interaction with federal and judicial agencies.99  
COP is the ideal platform for prevention programs at the front end of the law 
enforcement spectrum due to flexibility gained through its ability to engage multiple 
organizations in dealing with individuals who have not yet committed any criminal 
activity.  In prevention and intervention, the community and parents play the major role 
and are supported by city and county resources.  The last two elements, suppression and 
prosecution, are characterized by heavy law enforcement action supported by intelligence 
gained from the community.100  This far end of the spectrum can be better served by ILP 
and HSP style programs which focus on individuals actively plotting or committing acts 
either individually or within larger criminal or terrorist networks. 
4. Community Policing and the Comprehensive Gang Model: San Jose 
For the last 17 years, the city of San Jose has been slowly becoming one of the 
nation’s leading examples of the comprehensive gang model in COP.  Their strategy, 
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which incorporates prevention, intervention, suppression and community values, is based 
on two basic features: the Mayor’s Gang Prevention Task Force and the Bringing 
Everyone’s Strengths Together (BEST) fund.  The success of San Jose’s approach is 
evident by the reduction of crime by nearly 50%, lowering of the school dropout rate, and 
reduction in Juvenile Hall admissions along with reductions of commitments to the 
California Youth Authority and foster care. 101 
The San Jose model remains resilient and sustainable due to a sense of ownership 
from the community, a whole of government approach, and through the creation of 
internal funding, accountability, and strategy adjustment mechanisms.  Ownership by the 
community ensures continuity between electoral and budgetary cycles; which allows the 
Task Force and BEST fund to continue under “three mayors, four city managers, and 
three police chiefs”.102  The foundation of the San Jose success story is the overall sense 
of ownership felt by the community, when questioned after an election a community 
activist was asked whether the incoming mayor would support the pre-established Task 
Force. He replied, “of course it will continue, it’s not his, it’s ours.”103  The backbone of 
city involvement is the Police Department and the Department of Parks, Recreation, and 
Neighborhood Services (PRNS) which provide the bulk of the staffing and organization 
for Task Force events and meetings.  San Jose has also been able to maintain its strategy 
while delegating tasks through the separation of duties between a Policy Team and a 
Technical Team.  
The Policy Team is responsible for incorporating public opinion as well as 
making decisions on policy and strategy adjustments.  This team is composed of a wide 
range of representatives including but not limited to, “city parks and recreation, courts, 
law enforcement, faith-based community organizers, gang intervention experts, and the 
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state parole office and U.S. Attorney.”104  For a sample of agencies and organizations 
that can be involved in COP planning, see Figure 3.   
 
Figure 2.   Sample Agencies and Organizations 
The Technical Team, which functions as the staff of the Task Force, is made up of 
volunteers and employees from city, county, and community agencies.  This team meets 
monthly and is composed of police officers, school officials, PRNS staff members, along 
with other community representatives that have specific expertise in the areas being 
addressed by the team.  These two teams allow the Task Force to stay focused and 
flexible as strategic adjustments become necessary. 
The San Jose model is also based on five strategic goals: Service Delivery, 
Education and Public Awareness, Capacity Building, Crisis Response, and Local, State, 
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and National Collaboration.105  The overall vision is: “Safe and healthy youth connected 
to their families, schools, communities, and their futures.”106  This plan is reviewed by 
the Task Force in detail every three years at an annual retreat with solicited input from 
the Technical and Policy teams along with community input.  This collaborative process 
measures past success, and evaluates policies for the future, resulting in a new Strategic 
Work Plan, which then guides the Task Force over the next three years.107 
The San Jose model has been successful in reducing gang violence and has 
remained sustainable due to its strategy, organization and ability to decentralize functions 
to community agencies.  The Mayors Prevention Task Force has maximized an inter-
agency and whole of government approach along with a built-in funding capacity, 
accountability, and recalibration mechanisms.  This model allows the city to engage 
violence across the entire spectrum of law enforcement yet remain flexible enough to 
change focus on an annual basis to stay on top of changing conditions. 
5. Community Policing in Muslim Communities: Dearborn and 
Portland 
There have been several stated reasons for applying community policing to 
Muslim communities: it can promote outreach from the local government and police to 
the Muslim community, decrease isolation, promote integration, and potentially reduce 
alienation and other factors that can help lead to radicalization.  Also, it can provide the 
human intelligence resources needed to understand the language and cultural barriers 
associated with the Muslim community while identifying potential radicalization or 
terrorist activities.  Several programs focused on Muslim communities have been 
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implemented in France, Britain, Washington D.C., Boston, Dearborn, New York, 
Chicago, and Saint Paul.108 
a. Dearborn 
Home to the highest concentrated Arab population (380,000) within the 
United States, Dearborn and southeastern Michigan have a long history of community 
policing and interaction between local government and Muslim community. 109  Due to 
this large population, Dearborn has an extensive number of local service-oriented 
organizations and national organizations such as: American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee (ADC), Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), the Arab American 
Chamber of Commerce, Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services 
(ACCESS), American Civil Liberties Union- Michigan (ACLU-MI), Advocates an 
Leaders for Police and Community Trust (ALPACT), and the Michigan Alliance against 
Hate Crimes (MIAAHC).  This extensive history of political and social organization 
allowed easier integration with community policing initiatives after 9/11.110  
Following September 11, these organizations initiated efforts for mutual 
training and education for FBI, state and local law enforcement agencies so they could 
anticipate cultural issues that might arise with the increased focus and interaction with the 
Muslim community.  The Dearborn PD has recognized that individual patrol officers are 
the link between the government and the community and have accordingly focused on 
making this interaction positive.  Patrol officers are trained on core ideologies in an effort 
to be educated and knowledgeable about the cultural and religious backgrounds of the 
citizens within their daily beats.  This mutual training also focused on Muslim citizens 
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with the distribution of pamphlets informing community members on what to expect 
during encounters with law enforcement as well as advising them of their rights.  
The relationships between the Dearborn Police Department and the 
Muslim community are characterized by open communication and preemptive problem 
solving.  An example of this relationship is the handling of the Muslim communities’ 
protests of the imminent invasion of Iraq by the U.S. in 2003.  Due to its relationship and 
ability to communicate with the local community the police department was able to 
organize the event in a way which protected the participants while allowing them maxim 
visibility to exercise their first amendment rights.111  This fair handling of the event 
satisfied all involved and further solidified the trust between the Dearborn police 
department and its citizens.  This trust resulted in the formalization of communication 
through the establishment of the Building Respect in Diverse Groups to Enhance 
Sensitivity group (BRIDGES) which includes a hotline between police and community 
leaders. 
The success of the Dearborn program is due to the substantial pre-existing 
organizations and networks within the Muslim community, the priority placed on 
relationships and trust by the police department, formal and open lines of communication 
and the ability to preemptively solve problems collaboratively.  This emphasis is due to 
the view by the Dearborn Police Department that its role in Homeland Security is 
community protection.  They are focused on protecting their communities from terrorist 
attacks, whether “it’s through preventative patrols against possible targets, target 
hardening, or improving emergency response.”112  These actions, done for the benefit of 
the community, result in trust between the community and the police. Trust results in 
communication.  Communication results in a better informed police department (and 
better informed Mayor) who are then positioned to prevent threats to public safety due to 
intelligence gained from the community. 
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Home to a significant Muslim community, Portland’s COP experience has 
been seen as largely successful and mutually beneficial..  Several Muslim organizations 
are present to serve and represent this population: Arab Muslim Police Advisory Council 
(AMPAC), the Muslim Educational Trust (MET), Islamic Social Services of Oregon 
State (ISOS), and the Islamic Society of Greater Portland (ISGP). Portland’s Muslim 
community has a history of communication and engagement which resulted in positive 
relations which aided post 9/11 efforts on both sides.  These positive relationships appear 
to come from the social organizations proactive stance in the community and their 
involvement in inter-faith dialogue, cultural awareness seminars, and community 
outreach programs.  Portland’s community policing effort is most known for its refusal to 
help enforce immigration laws and rebuffs of homeland security agendas which it felt 
violated the traditional aspects of law enforcement.113 
Portland’s case is unique in that it is the initiative of Muslim leaders that 
keeps communication open keeping the community involved rather than isolated by 
events.114  Another unique aspect to the Portland case is the involvement of the Oregon 
U.S. Attorney, Dwight Holton.  Holton was involved in indicting Mohamed Mohamud 
for the Christmas tree attempt and saw it as a personal opportunity to get involved with 
the community.  He visited the Islamic Center of Corvallis where Mohamud prayed, met 
with a local refugee organization, chaired a town hall meeting, visited a youth center and 
spoke to young Muslims.115  By continuously engaging the community he has made 
several friends in the community and even invited several of them to dinner at his house 
so they could freely discuss topics such as U.S. foreign policy, homegrown terrorism, and 
FBI “sting” operations.  Holt’s goals are to network with Muslim community leaders and 
give them the resources and support so they can counter radicalization on their own. 
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The Muslim community in Portland has also been active in engaging 
young Muslims to prevent their participation in criminal activity and help with civic 
education and leadership training.  The Center for Intercultural Organizing is run by a 
Somali-American whose goal is to “tackle young people’s grievances and make them 
better citizens.”116  This a good example of the local organizations (ethnic, cultural, 
athletic, professional) that are available and can act as pre-existing structure with which 
to link future prevention projects. 
The programs described in Dearborn and Portland, which focus on 
addressing grievances and building trust, have met with success resulting in closer ties 
and integrated projects between the community and law enforcement which benefits the 
Muslim community as a whole.  The COP approach allows the Muslim community to 
interact with the government on many levels and also allows law enforcement to deal 
with issues that are created externally but still impact locally.  As noted by Ronald 
Haddad, Chief of Police for the Dearborn Police Department, “the perception of cultural 
bias in issues such as unfair national immigration policies, reported recruitment of 
informants within the local mosques, and racial profiling can all elicit a passionate 
community response.  These issues add a continuous burden on the local police 
department in building trust with the community in areas that were not created by- or in 
the control of- any police department. These factors cannot be allowed to impede 
progress.  Adhering to a community-oriented policing philosophy continues to be 
significant in overcoming these obstacles.”117  
However, these programs in the United States operate in the spectrum of 
law enforcement duties and have not yet been tailored to target the specific mechanics of 
radicalization.  Community policing programs, the correct vehicle from which to employ 
an effective counter strategy, are currently focused at the upper community level; but in 
their current form would fail to reach the granular level needed to counter the effects of 
radicalized messages being delivered in the recruiting grounds where cliques and activist 
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circulate and socialize.  These current COP models need the addition of a counter 
radicalization program that is specifically and locally tailored under the local COP 
umbrella.  Britain’s COP based Prevent program focuses, in concept, on several aspects 
of radicalization and is the only formal counter-radicalization program to date that has 
attempted to prevent radicalization with a national program that is implemented at a local 
level. 
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V. COMMUNITY POLICING AND COUNTER 
RADICALIZATION EFFORTS 
A. UNITED KINGDOM: PREVENT MODEL 
The United Kingdom’s current community policing efforts are a hybrid of 
counterterrorism and community oriented policing.  In 2003, the UK’s government 
announced the CONTEST program as its new multidimensional counter-terrorism 
strategy which consisted of four priorities: Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare.118  In 
2009 the UK launched CONTEST II, which shifted focus by making Prevent their 
priority and placed counter radicalization at the forefront of counterterrorism work within 
Britain. The Prevent strategy incorporates a wide range of community-based social 
programs to assist in undercutting local drivers of extremism.  This campaign, currently 
operated by the Department for Communities and Local Governments, features a bottom-
up approach that unites local moderate Muslim leaders and organizations with law 
enforcement authorities to counter radicalization.  
The Prevent plan works to raise awareness of Islamic radicalization within 
Muslim communities by focusing on at risk youth; it does this through the establishment 
of networks of diverse Muslims and by funding local organizations that provide youth 
alternatives such as sports, volunteering, and employment opportunities.  Prevent is 
delivered locally but stays within a national framework which has five distinct objectives 
which guide the overall effort: 
• Challenge the ideology behind violent extremism 
• Disrupt those who promote violent extremism and offer support 
• Support individuals vulnerable to recruitment 
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• Increase community resiliency 
• Address the grievances which ideologues are exploiting119 
Prevent is a fully funded national strategy with a long term focus which relies on 
its integration into all levels of government to be successful.  This holistic approach 
encompasses government and interagency involvement at all levels including community 
organizations.  The U.K. has delegated responsibility down to the local level but with 
clear guidance delineating the role of each participating agency, firmly nesting their goals 
and agendas under the framework of the national Prevent strategy.120  While the police 
are the most visible component, with each of Britain’s 43 Chief Constables being charged 
under law to develop and deliver Prevent within their jurisdiction, it also relies heavily on 
active community involvement and participation.  
Prevent is based on a cohesive set of teams that implement its strategy at all levels 
within the community, these teams are: Safe Neighborhood Teams (SNTs), Gold groups, 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and faith based organizations.  Safe 
Neighborhood Teams are dedicated team of policeman who deal with local issues and 
concerns.  Their time is spent patrolling in the community, meeting community members 
and addressing their concerns.  These strategies place SNTs in a position to identify 
community tensions, grievances or at risk individuals and intervene in a timely matter. 
Gold groups are networks of key community members (faith, business, or other 
influential persons) which can be assembled in the aftermath of significant events which 
affect the community such as an attack or terrorist related arrests.121  These groups can 
act as a trusted liaison in times of increased tension to facilitate crisis management and 
soothe community fears through clear communication.  The final piece of the network are 
the Faith based organizations and NGOs that form the direct link to the community 
leadership and infrastructure.  These can also include ethnic, cultural, athletic, 
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educational and vocational organizations that are already active within the community 
and interacting with members.  These teams work together to deliver Prevent projects and 
initiatives within their jurisdictions in a way that is tailored to local issues and local 
citizens. 
One such initiative is the Channel Project; the Channel Project is a national 
initiative developed to provide support to protect and safeguard vulnerable individuals 
from being drawn into violent extremism.122  Channel uses a case management approach 
to identify at risk youth and guide them into targeted intervention programs.  Participants 
include representatives from police, probation, local government, school systems, social 
services, health services who act as a multi-agency panel tasked with evaluating and 
placing referrals.  If the panel accesses a person to be at risk it will then assign the 
individual to the agency best suited to provide the style of intervention necessary.  
Participation by the individual at this point is strictly voluntary since the program is 
preventative in nature and the individual has not committed any crimes.   
Intervention efforts vary within Channel based on the tier concept; those who are 
merely at risk of being exposed are treated differently and nominated for different 
programs compared to those who are in the process of being radicalized.  Interventions 
can range from career development and educational opportunities for low-risk 
individuals, to targeted ideological intervention for high-risk individuals.123  Support for 
individuals referred under the Channel project can include: mentoring and counseling, 
theological guidance and discussion, educational projects, civic engagement, and working 
with the support network of the referred individual (family and peer networks) to help 
them challenge the influence of extremism within the individual.124  This wide range of 
options allows a tiered response to each individual case which can disrupt the 
radicalization process.  This graduated response based on a 4-tier system allows Prevent 
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programs to simultaneously execute short term and long term strategies and initiatives 
within the community. See Figure 4.  The majority of Prevent activity takes place within 
the lower three-quarters and highlights the primary role of community and NGO 
programming in the counter radicalization process.  Police participation and presence in 
these lower tiers consists of COP, outreach programs, vulnerability assessments and 
identification of at-risk individuals through their presence in SNTs. 
 
Figure 3.   The Intervention Pyramid (From 125) 
While the Prevent program has received praise because it enables a forum for 
ideas, empowers local Muslim organizations, and gives voice to a broad array of 
moderate Muslim voices, it has its drawbacks.  Due to the position of Prevent within a 
broader counterterrorism program it has several of the problems associated with HSP 
style programs.  As stated by the Institute for Community Cohesion in the U.K. House of 
Commons 2010 report Preventing Violent Extremism,126 
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The real problem with the Prevent agenda is simply that it is presently 
situated within a counter-terrorism strategy and implemented by a team 
dedicated to counter-terrorism and is therefore viewed through this lens 
with suspicion and apprehension; there is a strong belief that the 
community will be spied upon, wrongly accused and treated unfairly; or 
simply that the community is made guilty by association with terrorism.127 
This association is visible through the use of Counter-Terrorism Intelligence 
Officers (CTIOs) in Prevent which link MI5 and Special Branch to neighborhood 
reporting obtained by the local police.128  This relationship with counter-terrorism is 
counterproductive for counter radicalization programs and can “alienate the very 
community that it seeks to engage and influence positively, unwittingly heightening 
potential vulnerabilities to radicalization by terrorist propaganda.”129  
Another negative aspect associated with Prevent is the law enforcement 
terminology used and the misunderstandings it can cause in the Muslim Community.  
Terms such as “project monitoring” and “community mapping”, while common and 
simply descriptive within law enforcement, can cause the Muslim community to feel like 
the target of unwarranted attention.  Even the title of the program, Prevent, has caused 
misunderstanding.  The term, “prevent”, seems to imply that there is something 
inherently wrong and internal to Muslims that must be stopped. This perception results in 
the community receiving the negative message that, “we are here to stop you from being 
bad.”130  This has prompted the U.K. to allow local partners to rename the program to a 
theme that resonates positively with local participants. 
Prevent is currently the most comprehensive counter-radicalization program in 
the world, however, its relationship with the community and subsequent effectiveness is 
suffering due to its association with a larger counterterrorism program.  This relationship 
has caused the Muslim community to eye Prevent with suspicion as it is associated with 
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130 House of Commons, Preventing Violent Extremism, 2010, 8. 
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such activities as intelligence gathering, monitoring, and ‘mapping.’  While not 
exportable wholesale to the American community, overall the U.K. Prevent model along 
with the Comprehensive Gang model are a good starting points and promising 
frameworks which can be tailored to counter the specifics of shadow parenting at the 
individual level.  
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VI. PROPOSED MODEL 
A. HOW TO OPERATIONALIZE AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL 
The current task facing communities vulnerable to extremist messaging is the 
need to build counter radicalization programs throughout the community through the 
effective use of existing structures such as COP or existing social programs.  Well 
thought out and integrated prevention programs can provide law enforcement and 
community leaders with a pro-active, local solution that meets counter radicalization 
needs.  As this paper has shown, radicalization through social networks is a visible 
process that can be challenged and disrupted.  Yet, to successfully disrupt the informal 
processes of socialization, community leaders must first assess their communities as to 
whether they have vulnerable individuals, extremist activity, and the support of the 
community before moving forward with counter radicalization programs.  Once a 
recognized need is established they must create strategies that meet the unique challenges 
of their specific jurisdictions.  This chapter will lay out a framework which can guide 
community leaders as they develop and implement counter radicalization efforts. 
Assuming that social networking theory is correct in its interpretation of the role 
of networks and that the mechanics of radicalization as proposed by this paper are 
representative; is community policing as it is currently configured in Muslim 
communities ready to effectively counter and prevent radicalization?  The answer is no.  
Specifically, current models fail to address the system of socialization at the individual 
level among the networks of kinship, discipleship and friendship.  Counter radicalization 
techniques should focus on the individual relationships within the vulnerable social 
networks that are identified by local members of the community.  In order to counter 
these networks, programs must strategically interact with the strategy of the extremists to 
find a successful counter. As stated before, extremist activists have changed from a direct 




responses need to shift as well in order to be effective in countering radicalization.  These 
actions need to be indirect, decentralized, and operating at the individual’s level within 
the community. 
A tailored approach would enable programs to strengthen the bonds between the 
individual and parents/community while weakening the link between the individual and 
extremists.  This approach should focus on restricting “cognitive openings” by making 
vulnerable individuals resistant to extremist messages and providing positive alternatives 
for people suffering from alienation or other grievances.  Programs should be designed 
not only to compete directly with activists for the attention of the young male population 
but also to shape the environment they live in.  Creating an effective counter 
radicalization and prevention model within these competing social networks is a problem 
of strategy, organization, and level of interaction.   
1. Strategy (Indirect) 
The strategy necessary to successfully counter the indirect methods used by 
extremists is to support and enable non-law enforcement approaches which are initiated 
and led primarily by the Muslim community within the areas of vulnerability, 
congregation or those areas that contain recruitment magnets.  This approach should 
include efforts which address social issues such as integration and immigration policies, 
awareness training for social workers, policemen, teachers and Imams, and increased 
public diplomacy to dispel myths about Western foreign policy.  As noted before, the 
local community is often affected by events outside of their control, international or 
national events which can resonate locally with different constituents. Each Muslim 
community has unique geographical and ethnic ties to the global community which affect 
their daily life here in the United States.   
An indirect strategy must identify and empower key Muslim and non-Muslim 
community leaders and available organizations to develop and lead local prevention 
programs.  Participation by community representatives will ensure programs are 
representative of local needs and are able to identify individuals within vulnerable 
networks that are at risk, or have been exposed to extreme ideologies.  However, if local 
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leaders, who are representative of the target population, are not used communities will 
run the risk of developing generic programs which may not answer the diverse religious, 
ethnic, and cultural needs of each community. 
Much like the approach used in San Jose, programs should delegate guidance and 
authority down to local organizations and leaders which carry out the day to day activities 
autonomously but within the bounds and direction of the overall strategy.  An indirect 
strategy approach is defined by “big” community involvement and “little” law 
enforcement visibility.  The key is to avoid the stigma that prominent counter terrorism 
agendas, intelligence gathering activities and federal agency involvement can bring.  The 
best help that local police can provide in support of counter radicalization programs is a 
solid base of positive community interaction as seen in the Portland and Dearborn case 
studies.  This trust built at the upper levels will reflect down through all levels of 
interaction between the local government agencies and the community, facilitating the 
open dialogue critical for success.  Success is dependent on the recognition by local 
leaders and law enforcement that prevention programs and counter radicalization efforts 
are within the realm of social services and must be kept that way, with civilians in 
primary roles and law enforcement involvement limited to the supporting roles discussed 
above.   
Prevention programs and efforts should be based around generating awareness of 
extremist’s activities within targeted communities, empowering alternative groups 
(Figure 3), reducing isolation and alienation for immigrant members, challenging the 
ideology of extremism and reengaging individuals within Shadow Parenting networks to 
weaken the bonds among members.  This works to shape the environment of the targeted 
individuals and give them competing narratives which include them in the community 
and give them a sense of belonging.  These strategies will be most effective in the early 
stages of recruitment and group socialization before the individual’s identity has begun to 
merge with the group and before frame alignment is achieved  
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2. Organization (Decentralized) 
Organization of counter radicalization programs should be structured to ensure an 
integrated approach, which covers Tiers 1–3 of the Intervention Pyramid (See Figure 4).  
This “whole of community” approach must take into consideration the presence and 
effects of extremist socialization within each tier and develop distinct approaches to 
engage the individuals and sections of the community that may have differing views on 
and level of acceptance of extremist ideology.  Different agencies or organizations will be 
better situated within each tier to interact with vulnerable individuals; outreach efforts 
will also be unique within each tier as they meet the needs of different demographics.  
Coordinating these multiple level efforts requires a well researched and well defined set 
of goals which can act as an umbrella, providing guidance to ensure efforts overlap, 
remain integrated, and do not conflict with stated goals of the overall strategy.  
Under the tier concept this range of involvement will span engagement of the 
broader community to the specific engagement of individuals that are in the process of 
being radicalized.  Civic engagement projects should be initiated and coordinated at 
several levels ranging from involvement in Cub Scouts to parents involvement in school 
boards.  The community can identify the social networks and the places where they 
intersect with areas of vulnerability and plan ways to protect or offer alternatives to 
individuals attending these places.  The specialty teams mentioned within the case studies 
can provide the community with a framework to achieve this.  Subordinate efforts should 
consist of teams and projects styled after the U.K.s PREVENT model or the 
Comprehensive Gang model.  Safe Neighborhood Teams already exist in COP within the 
U.S. and can be dual tasked within vulnerable neighborhoods to assist with counter 
radicalization.  The Gold teams from the Dearborn example or cross functional teams 
(CFT’s)131 can provide the liaison between the community and the government on a wide 
array of issues and can be used to mediate and ensure transparency during times of crises.  
Teams should be physically placed within community centers or other similar areas to 
                                                 
131 Cross functional teams are components of COP programs and are small, specifically designed 
teams which consist of agency and service representatives that operate within certain geographical limits to 
provide at risk neighborhoods with key services in order to more responsive to community needs. 
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provide onsite help and immediate assistance to alienated individuals within vulnerable 
communities.  This places the counter radicalization effort directly within the recruiting 
grounds and allows them to contest the extremist for the individual’s attention on a daily 
basis.   
Once vulnerable places or networks are identified, programs can be specifically 
designed to interact in each unique area and with each unique network.  Examples of this 
could be after school programs or summer programs led primarily by the Muslim 
community that can provide alternate networks and activities designed to keep 
individuals engaged within the community.  Communities can develop and implement 
counter ideology efforts within these programs to confront the radical extremist narrative.  
Moderate Imams or political groups can coordinate seminars to educate people on factual 
and correct interpretations of Islam.  However, as evidenced by lessons learned in the 
PREVENT case study, the government should not attempt or become involved in 
defining “good” or “bad” Islam.  This must be an organic act of the Muslim community 
and should be strictly separated from any formal guidance by the government.   
The primary focus during organization should be to build overlapping programs 
that can prevent individuals from falling through the cracks and being missed by the 
community.  If an individual is not engaged at the mosque they will be engaged at the 
community center.  If they are not engaged at the community center, they will be engaged 
at school.  If they are not engaged at school, they will be engaged after school in athletic 
programs.  If they are not athletic they will be engaged by student civic activities or other 
extra-curricular activities.  The organization of counter radicalization programs must be 
engineered to provide redundant programs that maximize the individual’s exposure to the 
positive message of counter radicalization and maximize the chances of being diverted 
from extremist networks.  These efforts should be decentralized and guided by the 
inspiration and guidance of Muslim leaders and elders who have the trust and respect of 
their communities.   
Strategy development and organization similar to the San Jose model of 
community ownership, where the overall agenda is defined and agreed upon by a strategy 
committee after consultation with the community, would allow programs to best reflect 
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community concerns.  This requires an honest assessment done through either surveys or 
town hall meetings to assess the goals, attitudes and willingness of the community to 
engage.  This strategy is then delegated down to community organizations which work 
under the program’s umbrella but are largely autonomous in their execution.  This 
structure provides balance and allows for flexibility when it comes to incorporating the 
many different ideas and goals, which will be present in diverse communities.  This 
flexibility recognizes the fact that there may be many different types of Muslims 
(different nationalities, ethnicity, and religious sects…etc) which may be represented in 
one geographical area 
3. Level of Interaction (Individual) 
Personalized intervention programs, which interact at the individual level, are the 
most effective way to accomplish these goals and help prevent the fulfillment of the 
radicalization process.132  The proper level of interaction is the most important aspect of 
prevention programs.  Without reaching the level of the vulnerable demographic, 
programs will fail to deliver the services and narrative necessary to divert individuals 
from radicalization pathways.  Effective counter-radicalization, which utilizes strategic 
interaction, recognizes that it is a one-on-one individual struggle to successfully counter 
the effects of extremist socialization.  As one youth activists remarked in London, “First 
you need to find out what the driver (of vulnerability or alienation) is and what are his 
individual desires and habits.  Then you can start to build a project around him.  The idea 
is to get them into an environment where they become vulnerable to our messaging, 
rather than the extremist messaging.”133  If the strategy and organization of counter 
radicalization efforts are properly developed, programs will be able to be placed in areas 
that physically as well as ideologically challenge the effects of socialization at the 
individual level.  
                                                 
132 Seth D. Rosen, “Pathways To Prevention? Evaluating The United Kingdom’s Approach To 
Counter Radicalization” (Thesis, Georgetown University, April 2010), 22. 
133 Seth D. Rosen, “Pathways To Prevention? Evaluating The United Kingdom’s Approach To 
Counter Radicalization” (Thesis, Georgetown University, April 2010), 23. 
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Intervention and prevention efforts can develop within two broad categories of 
programs: societal/diversionary and ideological/rehabilitative.134  These broad categories 
address the two main areas of cognitive openings which can trigger seeking behavior 
among individuals.  The first category focuses primarily on individuals within Tiers 1 and 
2 while the second focuses on individuals within Tier 3 who may already be becoming 
radicalized.   
Programs which focus on societal needs or that provides diversionary activities in 
areas safe from extremist influence can be designed to reach certain demographics rather 
than being individual specific.  These could be social outreach programs that help 
immigrant parents understand English, immigration procedures, their rights, the rights of 
their children, how to apply for aid and even educate them on the dangers of extremists 
activities in their neighborhood.  For the kids, social projects could be civic engagement 
projects that engage the students in government and their community.  Diversionary 
programs can range from after school activities to summer camps and volunteer 
activities.  Efforts can be tailored to specific areas such as university campuses, coffee 
shops, or community centers.  Each effort should be designed to draw individuals into 
places that are safe and free of negative influences while delivering the messages of the 
counter radicalization strategy.  Prevention programs should also focus on providing 
young Muslims with alternative role models within the Muslim community for the young 
to emulate and admire.  In these programs, children and teens can be introduced to 
positive Muslim role models and shown the positive relationships between the Muslim 
community and the larger community.  However, broader programs such as these should 
also retain the ability to engage an individual that later becomes identified as vulnerable 
with specific services or refer them to an organization that deals with individuals. 
Programs that deal with ideological issues and offer rehabilitative services 
primarily focus on individuals entering or residing in Tier 3 and can deliver the specific, 
tailored, individual programs necessary to counter extremist ideology.  Programs must be 
tailored after a careful assessment by the community to identify recruiting grounds and 
                                                 
134 Seth D. Rosen, “Pathways To Prevention? Evaluating The United Kingdom’s Approach To 
Counter Radicalization” (Thesis, Georgetown University, April 2010), 24. 
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recruitment magnets within each community.  Community leaders and parents who know 
their communities are best positioned to focus these efforts in a non invasive manner.  
Whether it is a radical bookstore or an internet chat-room, the radical message and those 
who deliver it need to be directly challenged at every turn by community members intent 
on defending their communities.  Families and religious leaders or teachers can identify 
cliques of youth who appear to be radicalizing or who are beginning to seek and ensure 
their involvement in prevention programs.  These can be individuals referred from other 
programs as previously mentioned or recommended by a CHANNEL type board made up 
of members of the community, SNT’s, or CFT’s.  These chosen representatives interact 
daily with individuals within community areas and are best positioned to notice extremist 
networks at play among the population and design counter programs.  As with the 
CHANNEL model in the U.K., attendance must be voluntary and offered to the 
individual and their supporting networks in a transparent non-threatening manner.  
Following the concept of strategic interaction individuals should be invited into programs 
along with the friends or relatives they are networked with.  An individual may not want 
to attend programs simply out of the desire to be with their friends, but by inviting their 
friends it increases the chances of participation. 
B. CONCLUSION 
Through this proposed model of interaction, the community can effectively 
weaken and disrupt the socialization bonds of friendship, kinship, and discipleship which 
threaten their children.  This model, within the wider context of community policing, can 
empower communities and enable them to counter radicalized messages which focus on 
cognitive openings, frame alignment, and justification for violence.  Proper use of 
strategy, organization, and level of interaction can bridge the gap between COP 
infrastructures and counter radicalization efforts at the individual level within Muslim 
communities and disrupt the socialization processes of radicalization.  While this model 
offers a way for communities to develop counter radicalization efforts there are still many 
obstacles and considerations for programs that deal with religion and may appear to 
intrude on civil rights.  These programs not only deal with a domestic threat but an 
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international community conscious of their immigrant and minority status and of ethnic 
ties to geographical origins outside the U.S.  Community policing prevention programs 
tailored with an understanding of radicalization, the role of the Muslim community, and 
the primacy of civil liberties can balance these issues while disrupting domestic 
radicalization and serving homeland security interests. 
Counter measures must be able to counter radical narratives, disrupt and impede 
radicalization, and ultimately divert individuals from trajectories, which can end in 
terrorism.  These are not de-radicalization programs, which seek to change the minds of 
extremists but rather focused efforts to reduce the potential pool of recruits they affect.  
The goal of counter-radicalization is not to criminalize people or to seek prosecution, it is 
to influence people and offer alternatives to the extremists’ message and vision of the 
world.  There are several lessons from the U.K. PREVENT and the Comprehensive Gang 
Models which can be applied to the context of counter radicalization programs. Programs 
must be based on a comprehensive understanding of Muslim culture and the different 
pressures they face, and be heavily dependent on, and responsive to, community 
participation. Community planners must have well defined and transparent intentions 
during the strategy and organization phases of developing prevention programs.  The 
U.K. has delegated responsibility down to the local level but with clear guidance 
delineating the role of each participating agency, firmly nesting their goals and agendas 
under the framework of the national Prevent strategy.  This successful framework should 
be copied but participation should be voluntary.  Counter radicalization programs must 
not be mandatory but developed in answer to a recognized community need. 
The community must feel that the program is beneficial and places the benefit of 
the individuals first or they will not provide the participation necessary for success.  
Planners and leaders must also have thick skin and be able to incorporate criticisms.  
Though the PREVENT model was attacked by critics on several sides but the U.K. 
government learned from their mistakes, becoming more transparent and in the end has 
delivered a very successful model.  No program will be successful on the first try and 
planners must build in the flexibility and mechanism, which allow the community to 
reassess progress, incorporate criticism, and anticipate future community needs.  
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Programs can achieve this by incorporating the San Jose model’s internal methods of 
funding, planning teams, flexible strategy, and adjustment mechanisms.  These factors 
enable resiliency and the longterm focus which is critical as counter radicalization 
programs look to counter the effects of extremist activities. 
In the end, programs must be responsive to the community’s real needs, not 
national security agendas or a city council’s perception of what is needed. Programs must 
deliver a strategy which is centralized at the policy level, yet remains highly flexible and 
decentralized at the execution level. Long term organizational commitment, coupled with 
proper succession planning, is critical to ensure sustainability. And above all, planners 
must remember that prevention is not  primarily a police task nor is it a government task, 
it is a community task involving elements of health, social, community, faith, and NGO 
services, all delivered at the individual level.  
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APPENDIX A:  RADICALIZATION CASES POST 9/11 
This study draws heavily on the work done by Peter Neuman in his book Joining 
Al-Qaeda: Jihadist Recruitment in Europe, in this work Neuman develops the pathways 
through which individuals radicalize and are then recruited to acts of violence.  This 
paper has slightly modified the mechanisms and focused on the manipulation of networks 
based on kinship, friendship and discipleship. 
However, the problem remains that this original work was done on cases in 
Europe; are the mechanisms similar in cases of radicalization in the United States? To 
answer that question this paper looked at the 188 cases of radicalization as compiled by 
the New America Foundation and Syracuse University’s Maxwell School study. 135  
Those cases were then analyzed to see how the elements of Recruitment Grounds, 
Recruiters, and Shadow Parenting were represented in American cases of homegrown 
terrorism.  The standard for the presence of a mechanic was that it was clearly visible in 
open source reporting on the case.  It was not judged on strength or duration but simply 
on its clear presence and relation to extremist ideology in the individual’s life.  For a 
majority of cases in which the mechanics were not applicable, it was because the 
individual had spent a significant portion of their life outside the United States and had 
returned radicalized.  For a smaller portion of the non-applicable cases there was simply 
not enough information or a clear enough relation between a mechanic and their 
extremist activities. 
FINDINGS 
This paper found that the mechanics of socialization within informal social 
networks were present in a clear majority (71% ) cases. 
The internet was clearly a dominant factor in the seeking phase and radicalization 
of only 29 (15%) cases.  
                                                 
 135 Data set is compiled from the New America Foundation and Syracuse University’s Maxwell 
School study of the 188 cases of radicalization post 9/11. New America Foundation, “The Homegrown 
Threat,” 2011, accessed October 25, 2011, http://homegrown.newamerica.net/overview 
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Using the definitions by Garnstein-Ross and Grossman a spiritual guide/mentor (a 
more experienced Muslim who gave specific instruction and direction during the 
radicalization program) or sanctioner (an individual with perceived religious authority 
who provided specific theological approval for the violent activity)136 was apparent and 
influential in (13%) of the cases. While more several cases were linked to Anwar al-
Awlaki it was not clear that he had a direct role. 
Discipleship occurs only 14 times 
Friendship was by far the dominant network occurring 128 times. 
Kinship occurred 23 times. 
                                                 
136 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, and Laura Grossman. Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An 








2002–16 cases137    
James Ujaama Mosque, Internet Radical imam Discipleship,  
Kinship (brother) 










John Walker Lindh Madrassa, Internet friends Friendship 
Transference 











Kamal Derwis Used the mosque to 
target the L-6 




Charles Bishop n/a n/a n/a 




Shueyb Mossa Jokhan Mosque friend Friendship 




Semi Osman Mosque n/a n/a 
Imran Mandhai Mosque friend Friendship 
Hesham Mohamed 
Hadayet 
n/a n/a n/a 
Ali al-Marri n/a n/a n/a 
Adham Hassoun Mosque n/a n/a 
Table 1.   16 Cases of Radicalization in 2002 
 
                                                 
137 Data set is compiled from the New America Foundation and Syracuse University’s Maxwell 
School study of the 188 cases of radicalization post 9/11. New America Foundation, “The Homegrown 
Threat,” 2011, accessed October 25, 2011, http://homegrown.newamerica.net/overview. 
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2003–23 cases    
Donald Thomas 
Surratt 
Virginia “Paintball Cell” Al-Timimi Spiritual 
Sanctioner 
Friendship 




Masoud Ahmad Khan Virginia “Paintball Cell” Al-Timimi Spiritual 
Sanctioner 
Friendship 





Virginia “Paintball Cell” Al-Timimi Spiritual 
Sanctioner 
Friendship 





Virginia “Paintball Cell” Al-Timimi Spiritual 
Sanctioner 
Friendship 
Ibrahim al-Hamdi Virginia “Paintball Cell” Al-Timimi Spiritual 
Sanctioner 
Friendship 





“Portland 7” Family Kinship 
Patrice Lumumba 
Ford 
“Portland 7” Friends Friendship 
Muhammad Ibrahim 
Bilal 
“Portland 7” Friends/Family Friendship 
Ahmed Ibrahim Bilal “Portland 7” Friends/Family Friendship 
Jeffrey Leon Battle “Portland 7” Friends Friendship 
Habis Abdulla al-
Saoub 





Hasan Akbar “101st” N/A N/A N/A 
Iyman Faris N/A Friend Friendship 
Jaber A. Elbaneh Associated w/lackawana 




Uzair Paracha n/a Family (father) Kinship 
Hemant Lakhani n/a n/a n/a 
Majid Khan n/a Family (uncle and cousin) Kinship 
Nuradin Abdi n/a Friend Friendship 
 







2004–8 cases    
James Elshafay Bookstore Friend/FBI informant 
may have acted as the 
religious guide and 
father figure 
Friendship 
Clifton L. Cousins n/a n/a n/a 
Ryan Anderson Internet n/a n/a 
Ali al-Tamimi Virginia “Paintball Cell” 
leader who held private 
meetings at his home 





Mosque-Aref was his 
imam 
Spiritual guide Friendship 
Discipleship 
Mohammed Babar Internet, mosque Radical imam Discipleship 
Abdullah Warsame n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
Yassin Muhiddin Aref Mosque-he was an imam 
for Hossain 
Was the sanctioner Friendship 
Discipleship 
 







2005–12 cases    
Levar Washington Prison friend Friendship 
Kevin James Formed cell in prison and 
recruited others 
He was the activist He used friendship 
Gregory Patterson Mosque-recruited by 
Kevin James 
friend Friendship 
Tarik Shah n/a He was the activist n/a 
Jose Padilla Prison n/a n/a 
Brent al-Mutazzim Attended martial arts 
training with Tarik Shah 
friend Friendship 
Ahmed Omar Abu Ali n/a n/a n/a 
Kifah Jayyousi n/a n/a n/a 






Rafiq Sabir n/a Friend was Tarik Shah Friendship 
Ali Asad Chandia Virginia “Paintball Cell” Al-Timimi Spiritual 
sanctioner 
Friendship 
Shahawar Matin Siraj Bookstore Friend/FBI informant 
may have acted as the 











2006–18 cases    
Kobie Diallo Williams Camping trips Friend Friendship 
Adnan Babar Mirza Camping trips Friend Friendship 
Ehsanul Islam Sadequee Internet Friend Friendship 
Syed Haris Ahmed Internet Friend Friendship 
Narseal Batiste Leader of  “liberty City 
7” 
Friend Friendship 
Patrick Abraham Liberty City 7 Friend Friendship 
Stanley Grant Phanor Liberty City 7 Friend Friendship 
Rotschild Augustine Liberty City 7 Friend Friendship 
Burson Augustin Liberty City 7 Friend Friendship 
Hamid Hayat Lodi CA/ n/a Family(father) Kinship 
Naveed Haq n/a n/a n/a 
Adam Gadahn Mosque Friend-Spiritual Guide Friendship 
Mohammad Amawi Shooting range Friend Friendship 
Marwan El-Hindi Shooting range Friend Friendship 
Wassim Mazloum Shooting range Friend Friendship 
Mohammed Taheri-Azar n/a n/a n/a 
Abdulrahmane Farhane Bookstore owner where 
Tarik Shah and Sabir 
went 
n/a n/a 
Syed Hashmi n/a Gateway org n/a 
 







2007–15 cases    
Paul Hall (Abu Jihaad) n/a n/a n/a 
Derrick Shareef n/a n/a n/a 
Christopher Paul n/a n/a n/a 
Daniel Maldonado Internet-Islamic Network 
Forum 
Friend Friendship 
Khaleel Ahmed n/a Family Kinship 
Zubair Ahmed n/a Family Kinship 
Mohamad Ibrahim 
Shnewer 
“Ft Dix 6”Paintball, 
shooting range 
Friend Friendship 
Serdar Tatar “Ft Dix 6”Paintball, 
shooting range 
Friend Friendship 
Agron Abdullahu “Ft Dix 6”Paintball, 
shooting range 
Friend Friendship 


















Russell Defreitas n/a n/a n/a 





Houssein Zorkot University n/a n/a 
 







2008–5 cases    






Ruben Shumpert Barbershop, converted in 
jail 
Friends Friendship 
Jamal Sheikh Bana Gym, University Friends, Family Friendship 
Kinship 
Shirwa Ahmed Gym, University Friends, Family Friendship  
Kinship 
Aafia Siddiqui n/a n/a n/a 





2009–43 cases    
Aman Hassan Yemer “D.C 5” Mosque, 
Internet 
Friend Friendship 
David Williams n/a synagogue plot Friend/Family Friendship 
Kinship 
Onta Williams n/a synagogue plot Friend/Family Friendship 
Kinship 




Laguerre Payen n/a synagogue plot Friend Friendship 






Internet n/a n/a 
Ahmad A. Minni “D.C 5” Mosque, 
Internet 
Friend Friendship 
Waqar Hussain Khan “D.C 5” Mosque, 
Internet 
Friend Friendship 








Umar Chaudhry “D.C 5” Mosque, 
Internet 
Friend Friendship 






n/a n/a n/a 
Daniel Boyd Leader and father, 
broke from local 
mosque- led prayer 






Dylan Boyd Family 
house/military trng 
Family Kinship 
Zakaria Boyd Family 
house/military trng 
Family Kinship 
Ziyad Yaghi Prayer 
group/military trng 
Friend Friendship 
Anes Subasic Prayer 
group/military trng 
Friend Friendship 








Nidal Malik Hasan Mosque 
Internet 
Spiritual Guide Discipleship 






n/a n/a n/a 
Michael Finton Prison n/a n/a 
Abdifatah Yusuf Isse n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
Salah Osman Ahmed n/a Friend Friendship 
Najibullah Zazi n/a Family Kinship 
Mahamud Said Omar n/a n/a n/a 








Tahawwur Hussain Rana n/a Friend of David 
Headley 
Friendship 
Omer Abdi Mohamad n/a n/a n/a 
Kamal Hassan n/a Friend Friendship 
Mahmoud Hassan n/a n/a n/a 
Burhan Hassan Mosque Friend Friendship 
Tarek Mehanna n/a 
 
Friend Friendship 
Ahmad Abousamra n/a Friend Friendship 
Caabdullaahi Ahmed 
Faarax 
Mosque, prayer group Friend Friendship 
Mustafa Salat Mosque Friend Friendship 
Ahmed Ali Omar Mosque Friend Friendship 
Zakaria Maruf Mosque Friend Friendship 
Mohamed Abdullahi 
Hassan 
Mosque Friend Friendship 
Abdiweli Yassin Isse Mosque 
Prayer Group 
Friend Friendship 
Khalid Mohamud Abshir Mosque Friend Friendship 







2010-33 cases    
Shaker Masri internet Inspired by Anwar al-
awlaki/ Radical imam 
n/a 
Colleen LaRose Internet Friend Friendship 
Wassam al-Hanafi Internet Friend Friendship 
Sabirhan Hasanoff Internet Friend Friendship 
Mahmoud Alessa Gym/military trng Friend Friendship 
Carlos Almonte Gym/military trng Friend Friendship 
Faisal Shahzad n/a n/a n/a 






Adis Medunjanin Zazi Case- High school 
friends 
Friend Friendship 
Zarein Ahmedzay Zazi Case- High school 
friends 
Friend Friendship 
Antonio Martinez Internet Friend/FBI Informant, 
also allegedly inspired 
by Anwar al-Awalki 
Friendship 
Raja Lahrasib Khan n/a n/a n/a 
Hawo Hassan Charity n/a n/a 
Amina Ali Charity n/a n/a 
Adnan el-Shukrijumah n/a-   Zazi’s AQ 
recruiter/Saudi Born 
n/a n/a 
Issa Doreh Mosque Friend Friendship 
Abdisalan Ali University 
Mosque 
Friend Friendship 
Farooque Ahmed n/a n/a n/a 
Nima Ali Yusuf n/a n/a n/a 




Ahmed Nasir Taalil 
Mohamud 
Mosque Friend Friendship 
Mohamed Mohamed 
Mohamud 
Mosque Friend Friendship 
Basaaly Saeed Moalin Mosque Friend Friendship 
Farah Mohamed Beledi Mosque Friend Friendship 
Duane Mohamed Diriye n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
Zachary Chesser Internet Friends- also inspired by 
Anwar al-Awlaki 
Friendship 
Barry Bujol Internet Friends- also 
corresponded w/ Anwar 
al-Awlaki 
Friendship 
Abdikadir Ali Abdi Mosque Friend Friendship 
Jamie Paulin-Ramirez Internet Friends with Jihad Jane 
and Zazi online 
Friendship 
Abdi Mahdi Hussein n/a n/a n/a 
Sharif Mobley n/a n/a n/a 
Anwar al-Awlaki Mosque n/a n/a 
 







2011-15 cases    
Khalid Ali-M. Aldawsari n/a n/a n/a 
Ahmed Farhani n/a n/a Friendship 
Mohamed Mahdou n/a n/a Friendship 
Hafiz Khan Mosque 
He was the imam 
Family Kinship 
Irfan Khan n/a Family Kinship 
Izhar Khan n/a Family Kinship 
Waad Ramadan Alwan n/a Family Kinship 
Mohanad Shareef 
Hammadi 






Khalid Abdul-Latif n/a Friend Friendship 
Walli Mujahidh n/a Friend Friendship 
Emerson Begolly Internet n/a n/a 
Naser Jason Abdo Internet- Inspire 
Magazine 
n/a n/a 
Jubair Ahmad n/a n/a n/a 
Rezwan Ferdeus*138 Internet n/a n/a 
Table 10.   15 Cases of Radicalization in 2011 
                                                 
138* Not in the New America Foundation study’s original data set (it occurred post study). 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/28/rezwan-ferdaus-terror-plot_n_985759.html   
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